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CANARIES IN THE COAL MINE:
THE CHRONICALLY ILL IN
MANAGED CARE
John V. Jacobit
IF HEALTH FINANCE IS THE QUESTION, managed
care must be the answer. As government and employers seek a
model of health care finance that contains cost while offering ac-
ceptable quality, they turn as one to managed care.' Working the
most dramatic changes to Medicare and Medicaid since their crea-
t Professor of Law and Associate Director of the Health Law & Policy Pro-
gram, Seton Hall Law School. I am grateful to the Institute for Legislative Practice at
McGeorge Law School, at whose program on state regulation of managed care I pre-
sented an early version of this Article. I am also grateful to Charles Sullivan for his
helpful comments on a draft, to Seton Hall Law School for its financial support of the
research for this Article, and to Michael Polloway for his research assistance.
1 Managed care organizations (MCOs), for purposes of this Article, include
health maintenance organizations (HMOs), preferred provider organizations, (PPOs),
provider sponsored organizations, (PSOs), and point of service plans (POSs). See
Eric R. Wagner, Types of Managed Care Organizations, in ESSENTIALS OF MANAGED
HEALTH CARE, 37, 37-40 (Peter R. Kongstvedt ed., 2d ed. 1997). What unifies these
disparate entities for present purposes is a central feature of their organizational
structure, by which incentives and restrictions work to reduce the utilization of health
care services by covered persons. This organizational feature was nicely stated re-
cently by Professor Eaton:
While there are different types of managed care organizations (MCOs),
they share the common characteristic of integrating to some extent the
payment and provider function. Cost are controlled through a complex web
of agreements among payers, providers and patients. These agreements
tend to advance the cost containment objective by limiting the patient's
choice of physicians and hospitals, limiting provider compensation for
services, and establishing financial incentives that discourage the use of
expensive technologies and specialists. Thus, the managed care paradigm
is one of vertical and horizontal integration rather than one of independent
actors.
Thomas A. Eaton, Adapting Old Rules for a New Paradigm, 31 GA. L. REv. 367, 368
(1997) (focusing on how to apply principles formulated under a traditional fee-for-
service health plan to managed care). See also John D. Blum, The Evolution of Physi-
cian Credentialing into Managed Care Selective Contracting, 22 AM. J. LAW & MED.
173, 174-76 (1996) (analyzing the effect of capitation, the payment of a per-month
flat fee for a comprehensive array of care, and a central financial aspect of managed
care, to the evolution of health care delivery systems).
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tion in 1965,2 the Balanced Budget Act of 19973 reconfigured
those programs to shift beneficiaries from fee-for-service to man-
aged care systems.4 In addition, the Balanced Budget Act of 1997
created a new Title XXI of the Social Security Act, (State Chil-
dren's Health Insurance Program), which extends health coverage
to a broad range of uninsured children. This new program also
permits states to provide covered services through managed care
plans. This shift treats beneficiaries of those public programs more
nearly like those receiving employment-based coverage, 5 who are
now overwhelmingly subject to managed care.6 The subject of this
Article is a subset of the population - the chronically ill - that
comes late to managed care.7 Historically, managed care has ap-
2 See Social Security Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, 79 Stat. 291 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395-1395ccc (1998)) (adding Medicare to the Social Secu-
rity Act) and 42 U.S.C. 1396-1396v (adding Medicare to the Social Security Act).
3 The Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-33, 111 Stat. 251 (codi-
fied as amended in scattered sections of the U.S. Code).
4 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395 w-21 -28 (creating "Medicare+Choice" as Part C of
Medicare) and § 1396u-2(a)(1)(A) (amending Medicaid to give states, for the first
time, general license to "require an individual who is eligible under the State plan
under this subchapter to enroll with a managed care entity as a condition of receiving
such assistance").
In addition, the Balanced Budget Act of 1997 created a new Title XXI of the
Social Security Act, P.L. 105-33, sections 2101-2110 (State Children's Health Insur-
ance Program), which extends health coverage to a broad range of uninsured chil-
dren. This new program also permits states to provide covered services through man-
aged care plans. See also 42 U.S.C.A. § 1397aa (West Supp. 1998).
5 See Kenneth E. Thorpe, The Health System in Transition: Care, Cost, and
Coverage, 22 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 339, 340 (1997) (exploring the health care
system's change from a more passive model to a managed care system and analyzing
the effect of growing competitive forces on patient care and costs of care).
6 See Gail A. Jensen et al., The New Dominance of Managed Care: Insurance
Trends in the 1990s, HEALTH AFF., Jan.-Feb. 1997, at 125, 125 (noting that, as of
1995, "[n]early three-quarters of U.S. workers with health insurance now receive that
coverage through a health maintenance organization (HMO), a preferred provider
organization (PPO), or a point-of-service plan'); Prospective Payment Assessment
Comm'n, Medicare and the American Health Care System, 26 (1997) (noting that a
1996 survey of firms employing at least 200 workers found that 75% of employees
with insurance were enrolled in managed care plans); Jinnet B. Fowles et al., Taking
Health Status Into Account When Setting Capitation Rates: A Comparison of Risk-
Adjustment Methods, 276 JAMA 1316, 1316 (1996) (stating that, by 1995, managed
care covered approximately 71% of employees with employer-sponsored health in-
surance).
7 Chronic illnesses, for present purposes, are "long-term conditions that en-
compass diseases, injuries with long sequelae, and prolonged structural, sensory, and
communications abnormalities. They manifest themselves in physical or mental im-
pairments, and they emerge both at birth and throughout the lifespan." Lewis G.
Sandy & Rosemary Gibson, Managed Care and Chronic Care: Challenges and Op-
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pealed to, and therefore has disproportionately enrolled, well
members.8 This is changing, as deep market penetration in the pri-
portunities, in MANAGED CARE AND CHRONIC ILLNESS: CHALLENGES AND OP-
PORTUNITIES 8, 9 (Peter D. Fox & Teresa Fama eds. 1996). See also Bruce Jennings
et al., Ethical Challenges of Chronic Illness, HASTINGS CENTER REP., supp.
(Feb./Mar. 1988), at 1, 4, defining chronic illness as:
[A] condition that lasts for a substantial period of time or has sequelae that
are debilitating for a long period of time. It is also commonly defined as a
condition that interferes with daily functioning for more than three months
in a year, causes hospitalization for thirty days or more per year, or (at the
time of diagnosis) is likely to do either of these.
See also Medical Payment Advisory Comm., Report to the Congress: Context for a
Changing Medicare Program 143 (June 1998) (giving definitions and overviews for
vulnerable populations in Medicare managed care) [hereinafter Context for a Chang-
ing Medicare Program]; JON B. CHRISTIANSON ET AL., RESTRUCTURING CHRONIC
ILLNESS MANAGEMENT: BEST PRACTICES AND INNOVATIONS IN TEAM-BASED
TREATMENT 3 (1998) (discussing attempts to develop more precise definitions of
chronic illness); Catherine Hoffman et al., Persons With Chronic Conditions: Their
Prevalence and Costs, 276 JAMA 1473, 1474 (1996) (estimating that "total costs
projected to 1990 for people with chronic conditions amounted to $659 billion and
stating that although concerns about the costs of chrome conditions, few studies
about them have been performed). In short, the chronically ill have characteristics
that provide managed care plans economic disincentives to enroll or treat. See Con-
text for a Changing Medicare Program, supra, at 145 (detailing the relationship be-
tween the chronically ill and managed care organizations); Joseph Newhouse et al.,
Risk Adjustment and Medicare: Taking A Closer Look, HEALTH AFF., Sept.-Oct.
1997, at 26, 28 (discussing the access problems faced by chronically ill seeking to
enroll in health plans).
s See Patricia Neuman et al., Marketing HMOs to Medicare Beneficiaries,
HEALTH Aim., July-Aug. 1998, at 132, 138 (discussing how Medicare HMOs adver-
tise to target healthy seniors); Bryan Dowd et al., An Analysis of Selectivity Bias in
Medicare AAPCC, HEALTH CARE FINANCING REV., Spring 1996, at 35, 36-37; John
M. Neff & Gerard Anderson, Protecting Children With Chronic Illness in a Com-
petitive Marketplace, 274 JAMA 1866, 1867 (1995) (discussing the ways in which
managed care plans influence and who will enroll in other health care plans and stat-
ing that "it is possible that some fully capitated managed care plans may try to dis-
courage families of children with chronic illnesses from enrolling"); MEDICARE
PAYMENT ADVISORY COMM., REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: MEDICARE PAYMENT POLICY
(Mar. 1998) (describing why risk adjustment is necessary under Medicare); PHY-
SICIAN PAYMENT REVIEW COMM., ANNUAL REPORT To CONGRESS (1996) (Medicare
enrollees); Gerald Riley et al., Health Status of Medicare Enrollees in HMOs and
Fee-for-Service in 1994, HEALTH CARE FINANCING REVIEW, Spring 1996, at 65
(finding that the Medicare payment formula for HMOs does not adequately adjust for
the better health and consequent lower costs of HMO enrollees and discussing sug-
gestions for improvement); Gail R. Wilensky & Louis F. Rossiter, Patient Self-
Selection in HMOs, HEALTH AFF., Spring 1986, at 66, 68 (citing evidence of biased
selection among HMOs). But see Teresa Fama et al., Do HMOs Care for the Chroni-
cally Ill?, HEALTH AFi., Spring 1995, at 234, 242 (reporting extensive data analysis
and finding that those privately insured, noninstitutionalized persons under age sixty-
five who are covered by HMOs are as likely to be chronically ill as those covered by
indemnity insurance).
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vate market,9 and increasing use by Medicare l° and Medicaid,"
sweeps the chronically ill into managed care plans in large num-
bers. 12
The thesis of this Article is twofold. First, the broadening of
managed care's enrollment base poses problems for the chronically
ill, for governmental and business payers, and for the well popula-
tion. Most obviously, the chronically ill may be exposed to harm
as they move into managed care. In addition, payers may experi-
ence a resurgence of health care costs if managed care fails to en-
roll or properly care for the chronically ill. Further, the well popu-
lation, uneasy about the care offered by managed care, but unable
to assess directly the promises of quality services offered by plans,
can evaluate plans through the more intense experience of the
chronically ill. In this sense, the chronically ill will serve as "ca-
naries in the coal mine." Their treatment by MCOs is a bellwether
of the care to be provided to wider society.
9 See Jensen et al., supra note 6, at 126 (noting that, as of 1995, 73% of Ameri-
cans receiving health insurance through their employer were enrolled in managed
care plans); Douglas R. Wholey et al., HMO Market Structure and Performance:
1985-1995, HEALTH AFF., Nov.-Dec. 1997, at 75, 77 (stating that HMO enrollment
jumped from approximately 19 million members to approximately 58 million mem-
bers from 1985 to 1995).
1o See Medicare: HCFA Should Release Data To Aid Consumers, Prompt Better
HMO Performance, GAO/HEHS-97-23 at 14 (October 1996) ("Between August
1994 and August 1996, enrollment in Medicare risk-contract health maintenance
organizations (HMO) rose by over 80 percent (from 2.1 million to 3.8 million)...").
Risk-contract HMOs are those providing Medicare coverage pursuant to section 1876
of the Social Security Act. Risk contracts under that section will be phased out in
favor of the financial arrangements in Medicare+Choice. See 42 U.S.C.A. §
1395mm(k) (West Supp. 1997).
" See Health Care Financing Administration, National Summary of Medicaid
Managed Care Programs and Enrollment <http://www.hcfa.gov/medicaid/
trends97.htm> (last modified Feb. 27, 1998) (showing that the proportion of Medi-
caid population enrolled in managed care has increased from 9.53% in 1991 to
47.82% percent in 1997); see also Colleen M. Grogan, The Medicaid Managed Care
Policy Consensus for Welfare Recipients: A Reflection of Traditional Welfare Con-
cerns, 22 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 815, 815 (1997) (discussing that the Medicaid
managed care reform is about cost control, improving patient access, and addressing
welfare concerns, and stating that "by January 1995 all states (except Alaska) had
implemented some type of Medicaid managed care program").
12 See Karen Kuhlthau et al., Assessing Managed Care for Children with
Chronic Conditions, HEALTH AFF., July-Aug. 1998, at 42, 43 (reviewing how well
the Health Plan Employer Data and Information Set (HEDIS) assesses care for choni-
cally ill children in managed care covers an increasing number of children with
chronic conditions); see also Sandy & Gibson, supra note 7, at 8 (examining Medi-
care and Medicaid's use of managed care for the chronically ill).
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The secondary thesis is that the ability of managed care to
provide appropriately for the chronically ill is the acid test for
managed care's dominance of health care finance in the future. If
managed care can smoothly move from a system of care for the
basically well to one for all Americans, it can lay legitimate claim
to dominance of health care finance. If it is unable to accommo-
date coverage of the large, growing, disproportionately needy and
expensive chronically ill population, its social usefulness as an
economic form will have reached a significant limit, and we will
look elsewhere for a unifying model of health care finance, or
agree that managed care can serve as a health finance system for
only a portion of the population.
Health care costs for the chronically ill are higher - often
dramatically higher - than those of persons with acute illnesses
only.13 And health care is also different in kind for this group, with
an emphasis on "specialist care, supportive care, and non-medical
social services."' 14 Simply stated, what works - in terms of cost and
quality - for the well may not work for the ill. If it does not, then
society's reliance on managed care to solve our health financing
problems is misplaced. Section I of this Article describes the as-
sumed bargain that runs between society and commercial managed
care plans, and describes a group increasingly touched by that bar-
gain: the chronically ill. Section II then describes why we should
be concerned by the fit between managed care and the chronically
ill. Section III describes the efforts that have been, and might be,
made to retrofit commercial managed care to accommodate the
chronically ill, and evaluates the likelihood that such efforts will
be successful. Section IV examines two avenues available should
retrofitting commercial managed care to suit the needs of the
chronically ill not succeed: centralization of the allocation of en-
rollees to MCOs, and employing mixed-model reimbursement,
13 See Hoffman et al., supra note 7, at 1476 (comparing $272.2 billion in costs
for people with chronic conditions with $85.7 billion for people with acute condi-
tions). See also Neff & Anderson, supra note 8, at 1867 (discussing the dispropor-
tionately higher costs of providing health care to chronically ill children); Sarah
McCue Horwitz & Ruth E.K. Stein, Health Maintenance Organizations vs Indemnity
Insurance for Children with Chronic Illness, 144 AM. J. DIsEAsES CHILDREN 581
(1990) (providing an account of the time and expense incurred by hospitals and
families in caring for chronically ill children).
14 Context for a Changing Medicare Program, supra note 7, at 145. See infra
Section IV and text accompanying notes 236-41 (discussing care for the chronically
ill).
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with capitation and fee-for-service reimbursement coexisting for a
sizable portion of the population.
I. THE MANAGED CARE BARGAIN AND ITS
INCREASING RELEVANCE TO THE
CHRONICALLY ILL
A. The Bargain
Managed care is ascendant because its perceived ability to
coordinate treatment decision making, while applying economic
incentives to modify provider and patient behavior, promises con-
tainment of health care costs without reduction in quality.' 5 Deliv-
ering on this promise depends on minimal governmental regulation
to prevent gross market failure, such as a precipitous tilt toward
cost savings and away from quality.'
6
In a sense, insureds (or, more likely, others on their behalf)
have made a wary bargain with managed care. The fee-for-service
health care "system" presided over an unacceptable rate of medical
inflation. After various formulations of centrally planned managed
competition crashed and burned,' 7 consumers found themselves
15 See Paul M. Ellwood & George D. Lundberg, Managed Care: A Work in
Progress, 276 JAMA 1083, 1083 (1996) (discussing the past, present, and future
implications of managed health care on the quality of care); see also Stephen R.
Latham, Regulation of Managed Care Incentive Payments to Physicians, 22 AM. J.
OF L. & MED. 399, 407-08 (1996) (describing the potentially beneficial effects of
incentive payments on managed care, including reduction of unnecessary care and
elimination of overcare); Alain C. Enthoven, The History and Principles of Managed
Competition, HEALTH AFF., Supp. 1993, at 24, 37-38 (offering examples of managed
care's superiority over fee-for-service systems).
16 See Ezekiel J. Emanuel & Lee Goldman, Protecting Patient Welfare in Man-
aged Care: Six Safeguards, 23 J. HEALTH POL. PoL'Y & L. 635, 640 (1998) (dis-
cussing safeguards in the allocation of resources); Paul B. Ginsburg, The Dynamics of
Market-Level Change, 22 J. HEALTH POE. POL'Y & L. 363, 376-79 (1997) (arguing
that public policy has shaped change in health care even though no legislation has
been imposed and explaining that state initiatives have been opposed "not only by
health plans, but by purchasers, who are sensitive to restrictions on health plans'
ability to contain costs"); Clark C. Havighurst, Making Health Plans Accountable for
the Quality of Care, 31 GA. L. REV. 587, 590 (1997) (discussing the need for legal
accountability of MCOs to persons injured due to a failure of quality standards in
order to maintain minimal government interference in the industry).
17 See Sven Steinmo & Jon Watts, It's the Institutions, Stupid! Why Comprehen-
sive National Health Insurance Always Fails in America, 20 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y &
L. 329, 330 (1995) (arguing that the failure to implement national health insurance in
the United States can be attributed to institutional bias against comprehensive care);
see also Hugh Heclo, The Clinton Health Plan: Historical Perspective, HEALTH AFF.,
[Vol. 9:79
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(sometimes without being consulted'8) in managed care plans
regulated only lightly by government on the promise that the mar-
ketplace would police both cost and quality.19 Whether managed
care can live up to its end of the bargain in terms of the general,
basically well population is the subject of dispute20 and time and
further study will tell.
As managed care finds itself serving the substantial minority
of the population with chronic illness, both its cost saving and
quality preserving abilities face challenges. The essence of the
bargain with managed care depends on its treatment of moral haz-
ard.21 The fee-for-service system had been plagued famously with
this phenomenon, in which those making spending decisions
(chiefly physicians and patients) were not meaningfully answer-
Spring 1995, at 86, 87 (discussing pre-Clinton attempts to achieve national health
insurance, noting that, historically, most major social reform efforts have rarely suc-
ceeded).
IS See Diane E. Hoffmann, Emergency Care and Managed Care - A Dangerous
Combination, 72 WASH. L. REV. 315, 349 (1997) (relating how employers increas-
ingly limit employees' choice of health insurance to a single plan); see also Dayna
Bowen Matthew, Controlling the Reverse Agency Costs of Employment-Based Health
Insurance: Of Markets, Courts, and a Regulatory Quagmire, 31 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 1037, 1045-47 (1996) (describing various methods employed unilaterally by
employers to reduce costs).
19 See Barry R. Furrow, Regulating the Managed Care Revolution: Private Ac-
creditation and a New System Ethos, 43 VIL.. L. REV. 361, 396-97 (1998) (defining
"accreditation" and discussing its benefits with respect to health care institutions);
Paul M. Ellwood & Alain C. Enthoven, "Responsible Choices": The Jackson Hole
Group Plan for Health Reform, HEALTH AFF., Summer 1995, at 38 (explaining the
Jackson Hole Group's accountability system, which operates under a private um-
brella organization composed of a broad range of participants).
20 See Harold S. Luft, Perspectives and Evidence on Efficiency in Managed
Care Organizations, in COMPETITIVE MANAGED CARE: THE EMERGING HEALTH CARE
SYSTEM 30, 51-52 (John D. Wilkerson et al. eds., 1997) (discussing the difficulties of
analyzing information on HMO and managed care performance, and indicating that
rating their perforamnce is becoming more difficult); Donald M. Berwick, Payment
by Capitation and the Quality of Care, 335 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1227 (1996) (discuss-
ing capitation as a form of managed care and its effect on different segments of the
managed care population); Robert Miller & Harold S. Luft, Managed Care Plan
Performance Since 1980: A Literature Analysis, 271 JAMA 1512 (1994) (comparing
the health care utilization, expenditure, quality of care, and satisfaction since 1980 of
enrollees in managed care and indemnity plans and concluding that, although several
clear patterns of results existed, generalizations must be made with caution).
21 See CLARK C. HAVIGHURST, HEALTH CARE LAW AND POLICY: READINGS,
NOTES, AND QUESTIONS 80-88 (1988) quoting excerpts from PAUL JOSKOW,
CONTROLLING HEALTH COSTS: THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT REGULATION 20-31, 36-39
(1981) (describing the rational disinclination of insureds and their physicians to
economize on health care if the patient has rich insurance with low cost-sharing).
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able to those funding the coverage (chiefly government and em-
ployers) for their choices. Managed care seeks to end the inflation-
ary effect of moral hazard by collocating much of the power to
approve and direct treatment with the financial incentive to do so
cost-effectivelyY
As the cost of health care rose, apparently impervious to at-
tempts by payers to intervene, then, managed care descended as
deus ex machina. The bargain it offers to public and private payers
is moderation of health care cost inflation and relief from direct
responsibility for the formation, maintenance, and compensation of
a seemingly unmanageable array of health care providers. In re-
turn, MCOs required the power to control their networks of pro-
viders and, in the case of the majority of MCOs that are for-profit,
the opportunity to retain a portion of the realized cost savings.
Payers, in other words, ship off their headaches of managing pro-
viders and of developing ever-more-intrusive methods of control-
ling costs. 23 The bargain could be characterized as a cynical one, in
which payers, sensitive to public approbation and reluctant to take
harsh steps to rein in health care costs, hired MCOs as intermedi-
aries to do the dirty work. But there is a non-cynical explanation
for the bargain.
When payers attempted to tame inflation with per-unit con-
trols, they were hopelessly outflanked by providers' control over
the description of those units of service (leading to, e.g., "DRG
creep" and "up-coding" 24) and providers' control over the volume
22 See Eaton, supra note 1, at 368 (comparing cost-management in fee-for-
service and managed care plans).
23 See Matthew, supra note 18, at 1046 (discussing the fact that employers are
purchasing managed care options in order to lower their premium rates, and thereby,
their health insurance costs).
24 "DRG creep" and "CPT creep" are related phenomena in which health care
providers seek to maximize reimbursement in systems using per-unit or per-case
payment. DRGs are diagnostic related groups, a designation of an inpatient case that
forms a unit of care for hospital reimbursement purposes. CPT (Current Procedural
Terminology) codes are designations of medical procedures used for many purposes,
including physician reimbursement. Hospitals and physicians engage in DRG creep
and CPT creep (or upcoding) when they represent hospital cases or procedures as
relatively highly reimbursed cases or procedures, when they could or should be de-
scribed as belonging in lesser categories. See Peter R. Kongstvedt, Compensation of
Primary Care Physicians in Open Panel Plans, in ESSENTIALS OF MANAGED HEALTH
CARE, supra note 1, at 135 (discussing problems associated with the use of unman-
aged fee-for-service plans).
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of services?5 Price controls, then, often resulted in increases in
volume, and therefore failed to contain costs.2 6  But MCOs can
control costs globally, through more thorough control of providers.
MCOs achieve much of their cost saving not through direct ra-
tioning or explicit restrictions in services, 27 but by creating incen-
tives for "down-stream" network providers to economize. These
incentives arise through now well-understood payment mecha-
nisms such as capitation and performance bonuses and withholds,
and through "economic credentialing," by which providers' initial
or continued membership in the MCOs' networks depends on an
assessment of the "efficiency" of their practice habits. "
This flipping of providers' incentives to treat - turning a mar-
ginal medical procedure from an opportunity for gain to an oppor-
tunity for loss - promises to control medical inflation. But the bar-
gain between payers and MCOs is for moderated cost and undi-
minished quality. In theory, MCOs are able to achieve the quality
piece of the bargain through the same mechanism that allows price
moderation: close control over provider networks. 29 And payers
25 See Peter D. Fox, Applying Managed Care Techniques in Traditional Medi-
cine, HEALTH AFF., Sept.-Oct. 1997, at 44, 45 (discussing general aspects of managed
care, such as its attempts "to maximize the value of the health care dollar" and to
exclude from consideration "measures whose primary focus is price-per-unit serv-
ice")A See id. at 45 (stating that "the Federal government has had far greater success
in controlling unit costs than in controlling utilization").
27 Some explicit restrictions, of course, exist, such as limits on the pharmaceuti-
cals to which a member may have access, or on the hospitals from which he may
obtain service. See Barry R. Furrow, Managed Care Organization and Patient Injury:
Rethinking Liability, 31 GA. L. REv. 419, 446-51 (1997) (illustrating restrictions on
subscriber choices in cases where plaintiffs claimed that injuries resulted from the
unwillingness of providers to pay for certain treatment options). In addition, the ef-
fect of financial incentives used by MCOs to control provider behavior appears in-
distinguishable in effect from rationing in some cases. See id. at 465-69 (discussing
lawsuits based on the failure of cost-containment activities such as financial incen-
tives directed toward physicians); see also John V. Jacobi, Patients at a Loss: Pro-
tecting Health Care Consumers Through Data Driven Quality Assurance, 45 U. KAN.
L. REV. 705, 710-19 (1997) (characterizing the cost-saving control and pressure as
subtle and overt, in addition to describing incidents and factors that have caused con-
sumers to doubt the loyalty of care givers).
28 See Blum, supra note 1, at 182-83 (evaluating the pros and cons of hospitals'
use of economic variables in credentialing of physicians).
29 See Alice G. Gosfield, Who is Holding Whom Accountable for Quality?,
HEALTH AFr., May-June 1997, at 26, 36-37 (discussing the means used by health care
plans to hold providers accountable, such as credentialing, selection, and termination
of providers based on quality factors). See generally Pamela B. Siren & Glenn L.
Laffel, Quality Management in Managed Care, in ESSENTIALS OF MANAGED HEALTH
1999]
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(and consumers) can (again, in theory) monitor that quality effi-
ciently, because each MCO provides a coherent set of services
through an organized, testable set of providers, rendering it ac-
countable by means of reporting and analysis by private and public
quality analysis mechanisms. 30 So MCOs promise to reduce medi-
cal inflation, maintain quality, undertake the day-to-day network
maintenance tasks, and to be accountable in their performance.
There is some evidence that payers' switch to managed care
has netted them price moderation without measurable diminution
in quality, at least with non-chronically ill populations. Therefore,
payers can be seen as rationally and non-cynically buying into the
bargain with managed care. They are "privatizing" their health
coverage by handing over to MCOs broad responsibility for pro-
viding a defined set of health care services to a group of enrollees
31
at a set price.
Assume for present purposes that this stratagem is or can be
successful for the first wave of the well, largely volunteer, man-
aged care members. 32 Can the deal hold for the next wave of en-
rollees - the elderly and disabled? This group of enrollees poses
significant problems for "privatized" managed care. These struc-
tural problems are embedded in the bargain itself, and the con-
CARE, supra note 1, at 274-98 (1997) (describing various management methods un-
dertaken by MCOs to control quality).
30 See Barry R. Furrow, supra note 19, at 396-404 (discussing the private ac-
creditation of health care institutions and the National Committee on Quality Assur-
ance (NCQA) standards); see also Jacobi, supra note 27, at 766-70 (discussing "in-
dependent systems of quality evaluation").
31 "Privatization" is the proper term for this phenomenon with public payers
such as Medicare and Medicaid. Those programs eliminate the public function of
network formation, maintenance, and compensation by contracting with MCOs on a
capitated basis. For private payers, the more proper term for this ceding of function
would be "contracting out."
32 The day of meaningful consumer choice between managed care and non-
managed care plans may soon be over, even in the private sector. As Donald Moran
has recently observed;
Up until a few years ago it was possible for most Americans to avoid man-
aged care benefits options at only a modest incremental cost in terms of
premiums and copayments. Within the past few years, however, the price
differential between managed and unmanaged care options has risen, and
many private employers are restructuring their health benefits to expose
beneficiaries to the full incremental cost of selecting less-managed options.
In this environment, plans find themselves enrolling a growing number of
"involuntary recruits"....
Donald W. Moran, Federal Regulation of Managed Care: An Impulse In Search Of A
Theory?, HEALTH AFF., Nov.-Dec. 1997, at 7, 14.
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tinuing validity of the bargain may depend on the existence of so-
lutions for these problems.
B. The Chronically Ill
Medical and public health progress in this century has steadily
advanced life expectancy, creating cures for previously fatal dis-
eases, and reducing or ending threats of previously virulent infec-
tious diseases.33 As a result, Americans who in prior times would
have died of acute conditions now increasingly survive and thrive,
often living with long-term chronic conditions.3 4 The chronically
ill live with long-term, even permanent conditions such as cancer,
cystic fibrosis, muscular dystrophy, spina bifida, and heart dis-
ease.
3 5
The number of Americans with significant chronic illnesses is
very large, and growing. Perhaps the most widely cited recent
study of chronically ill Americans was published in 1995 by the
Institute for Health and Aging at the University of California, San
Francisco. 36 This study examined the results of several large sur-
veys, and estimated the number of Americans with a significant
33 See Christine K. Cassel, Issues of Age and Chronic Care: Another Argument
for Health Care Reform, 40 J. AM. GERIATRICS SOC'Y 404, 404 (1992) (stating that
almost 80% of the population in the United States now survives past the age of 65).
34 See id. at 404 (footnotes omitted):
The successes of 20 'h century society and medicine have led to a shift from
the predominance of acute illness to a predominance of chronic illness in
all age groups. By preventing death from infectious diseases and postpon-
ing death from degenerative diseases such as coronary artery disease and
stroke, the vast majority of premature deaths have been prevented, allow-
ing almost 80% of the population in the United States to survive past the
age of 65. This phenomenon accounts for the increasing life expectance of
Americans and also for the increasing prevalence of chronic non-fatal dis-
eases of old age such as arthritis, visual and hearing disorders, and demen-
tia. On a smaller scale; but just as impressively, disabilities of childhood
can now be survived, and many people now live their entire life span with
major motor or cognitive disabilities. For example, we are seeing studies of
the aging of persons with major spinal cord injury and paralysis. Children
with severe sickle cell disease or cystic fibrosis are surviving, at least into
young adulthood, but now with significant ongoing chronic disease and
need for medical care. These survivors, both young and old, are products of
a developed and aging society.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
5 See id. (noting that medical advances and studies which result in increasing
life expectancy are characteristics of an advanced civilization); Jennings et al, supra
note 7, at 4 (noting that individuals with chronic illnesses vary widely in the severity
and manageability of their impairments).
6 Hoffman et al., supra note 7, at 1474.
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chronic condition, which was defined as an impairment or a con-
dition that "creates persistent and recurring health consequences,
lasting for periods of years (not days or months). 37 The study es-
timated that about 100 million Americans had at least one such
chronic condition in 1995.38 The authors noted that this estimate
exceeded expectations, perhaps reflecting common confusion be-
tween the concepts of chronic illness and impairment - the latter
being both the narrower category and the more frequent subject of
data analysis. 39 The Institute for Health and Aging study went be-
yond those with impairments, also counting those "living normal
lives" but under a threat of "recurrent exacerbations" such as ele-
vated health care costs.4° The Institute's choice of the broader
definition seems entirely appropriate in light of its purpose. It was
primarily interested not in the ability of disabled persons to un-
dertake activities of daily living, but in the financial impact of a
large and growing population of chronically ill on maintaining and
reforming American health care finance.4' Even if a more restric-
tive definition is applied, limiting the chronically ill to those with
an "ongoing functional impairment," the number of chronically ill
can be estimated at about forty million.42 And the chronically ill
span the age spectrum, as ten to thirty percent of children experi-
ence chronic illness to some degree, with ten percent dominating
health expenditures, the majority of whom "have one or more se-
vere chronic illnesses." 43
37 Id. at 1474.
38 Id. at 1477. See Christianson et al., supra note 7, at 1 (citing Institute for
Health and Aging study).
39 Hoffman et al., supra note 7, at 1477.
4 Id.
41 See id. at 1474:
Successful cost containment will have to address the needs of this rela-
tively small group with extreme medical needs. This realization has con-
tributed in part to the emergence of managed care organizations as a domi-
nant form of health insurance coverage .... Despite ... concerns about the
costs of managing chronic conditions, there are few sources of data that
allow us to weigh the overall economic and social impact of chronic con-
ditions.
42 See Sandy & Gibson, supra note 7, at 9 (citing the definition of "chronic ill-
ness" used by the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation when it made "improving serv-
ices for people with chronic conditions" a major priority for the 1990s).
43 Neff & Anderson, supra note 8, at 1866 (footnotes omitted) (providing exam-
ples of severe chronic illnesses). See Horwitz & Stein, supra note 13, at 581
("[d]epending on the way in which chronic illness is defined, between 10% and 20%
of U.S. children have some health impairment, and this percentage appears to have
risen in recent years").
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One significant aspect of chronic illness for present purposes
is its association with high medical costs. 44 The Institute for Health
and Aging study found that the annualized per capita direct health
care costs45 for the chronically ill were more than three times
higher than those for persons experiencing only acute illness: in
1987, $3074 for those with chronic conditions, compared with
$817 for those with only acute conditions. 46 Medicare data suggest
that the cost of care for beneficiaries with chronic conditions is
well over twice the average cost.47 Analysis of data specific to
children suggests that the annual health care costs for chronically
ill children can range to five times that of well children. 48 This cost
disparity leads to a dramatic skewing of health care cost distribu-
tions. For example, in a recent year, one state devoted over seventy
percent of its children's Medicaid expenditures to ten percent of
the enrolled children, with the remaining thirty percent of the re-
sources spread over the remaining ninety percent of enrolled chil-
dren.49 Medicare's experience has been similar for many years,
with about eleven percent of Medicare enrollees accounting for
over seventy percent of program expenditures.50 In short, the
44 Another is the very different health and social service requirements of the
chronically ill. See infra Part IV, text accompanying notes 236-41 (describing the
unique nature of chronic care, and distinguishing between the treatment goals and
approaches of chronic care and acute care).
45 Costs the authors included in direct health care costs were "hospital stays,
physician and other health professional visits... prescribed medicines, and medical
equipment and supplies." Hoffman et al., supra note 7, at 1475.
Id. at 1476, Table 2. The difference grows even more dramatic when the per
capita cost of those with at least two chronic conditions is contrasted with those with
only acute conditions: $4672 vs. $817, in 1987. And the scale of difference remains
similar across age classifications. See id. at Table 2.
47 See Context for a Changing Medicare Program, supra note 7, at 145-48 (using
the 1996 Medicare Current Beneficiary Survey (MCBS) conducted by the Health
Care Financing Administration (HCFA), to illustrate the differences in cost and en-
rollment between vulnerable population members and managed care members in
general).
48 Neff & Anderson, supra note 8, at 1866 (providing examples of illnesses
requiring substantial health care costs).
49 See id. at 1867 (reporting the Washington State Medicaid program data from
1993).
50 See High-Cost Users of Medicare Services, HEALTH CARE FINANCING REV.:
MEDICARE & MEDICAID STAT. SUPP., 1996, at 32, 32.
Medicare program spending is concentrated on a relatively small percent-
age of enrollees with serious medical problems. As a result, certain groups
of beneficiaries account for a disproportionate share of Medicare program
payments. In 1994, about II percent (4.1 million) of all Medicare enrollees
had payments of $10,000 or more and accounted for 73 percent ($106.8
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chronically ill have characteristics that provide managed care plans
economic disincentives to enroll or treat.
51
The percentage of those with chronic illness is certain to in-
crease in the future as the population ages. "[B]oth the incidence
and the prevalence of all types of chronic illness are positively cor-
related with increasing age, and rise to particularly high levels in
the population over sixty-five., 52 And the American population is
aging dramatically. The proportion of Americans over the age of
sixty-five is expected to grow from one in eight in 1990 to one in
five in 2030.53 Severe as are the systemic problems presented by
the chronically ill today, then, the stakes will only rise in the fu-
ture.
II. WHY THE TREATMENT OF THE
CHRONICALLY ILL BY MCOs MATTERS
As the above describes, the number of Americans with at least
one significant chronic illness is enormous and growing. And as
the chronically ill move from fee-for-service to managed care fi-
nancing, 54 they face the dual dangers of excluding and stinting.
Both problems derive from the nature of the bargain between pay-
ers and MCOs, in which the incentive to overtreat is transformed
to an incentive to undertreat, and the well patient, rather than the
patient in need of a long course of expensive treatment, is the hot
commodity. Managing risk, and avoiding it where possible, is
central to the success of a managed care plan.
billion) of all Medicare payments. This distribution of payments has re-
mained stable during the past two decades.
Id.
51 See Context for a Changing Medicare Program, supra note 7, at 145 (stating
reasons why such health plans may not be the best sources of care for the chronically
ill); see also Newhouse et al., supra note 7, at 28 (stating that -plans have incentives
to configure themselves such that they will not appeal to bad risks," thus creating
access problems for the chronically ill).
52 Jennings et al., supra note 7, at 5.
53 Hoffman et al., supra note 7, at 1478 (commenting on the projected increase
of people with chronic conditions due to declining mortality and medical advances).
See Christianson et al., supra note 7, at I ("On average, health care costs for indi-
viduals with chronic illnesses are three times the costs of the care delivered to others.
As the United States's population ages over the next few decades, expenditures for
chronic illness care are expected to increase dramatically from this already high
level").
54 See supra text accompanying notes 9-12 (explaining how market forces are
moving chronically ill patients into managed care plans).
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Actuarial assessment of risk is not new with managed care,
but has long been central to the business of health insurance. 55
Crucial to the insurer's business judgment is his ability to deter-
mine whether the price offered for coverage of an individual or
group comports with the expected cost of such coverage.56 Where
uniform prices are offered - that is, where the insurer cannot bar-
gain for a higher premium in cases of higher expected cost - the
insurer will, where permitted, prefer the good risk (the person or
group with a lower expected cost) to the bad risk (the person or
group with the higher expected cost).57 Such incentives continue to
exist when the form of health coverage moves to managed care.
Indeed, because the risk assumed under modem, largely managed
care-based health insurance is larger than ever (reflecting higher
costs of health care), the incentives to pick and choose among po-
tential insureds may be higher. 8 The economic incentive remains,
of course, even when a plan is formally obligated to accept all
qualified applicants - to eschew risk selection. In addition, modem
MCOs seek to contain costs in large measure by taking advantage
of their control over the financial incentives of their downstream
providers to treat. Common mechanisms of provider reimburse-
ment, such as capitation and financial incentives for utilization
control,59 are therefore capable of more effectively limiting care
after a chronically ill person has enrolled. 6°
55 See KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, DISTRIBUTING RISK: INSURANCE, LEGAL THEORY
AND PUBLIC POLICY 64-69 (1986) (discussing the development of legal policy dealing
with isk-assessment insurance classification).
r6 See id. at 67 (discussing how risk classification results in lower premiums for
healthy insureds, thereby allowing the insurer to attract healthy, low-risk customers
and consequently, maintain a high profit).
57 See generally id. at 64-65 (discussing how insurers use both risk-assessment
and risk distribution to eliminate the majority of high-risk customers and spread the
cost of those who are not eliminated, thereby maintaining the lowest premium rates).
58 See Richard G. Frank et al., Solutions for Adverse Selection in Behavioral
Health Care, HEALTH CARE FINANCING REV., Spring 1997, at 109, 109-10 (discussing
the adverse selection process, in which managed care companies attempt to eliminate
costly high-risk members).
9 See supra text accompanying notes 27-28.
60 See Jonathan B. Oberlander, Managed Care and Medicare Reform, 22 J.
HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 595, 615-16 (1997) (analyzing and comparing the various
organizational types of HMOs). See also Frank et al., supra note 58, at 114 (asserting
that HMOs use practices to limit the amount of care they must provide to patients
with mental health or substance abuse problems); Linda F. Wolf & John K. Gorman,
New Directions and Developments in Managed Care Financing, HEALTH CARE
FINANCING REV., Spring 1996, at 1, 1-2 (discussing the limiting effects that capitation
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Managed care plans can turn risk selection and organizational
control to their advantage in two ways. First, they can engage in
excluding, by which I mean the practice of avoiding enrollment or
reenrollment of high-risk, otherwise-qualified persons. Although
excluding is often prohibited, the incentives among plans to bend
the rules where premium adjustment underreflects expected costs
is enormous. The following example gives a sense of the scale of
the incentives faced by plans. It describes Medicaid managed care
reimbursement in one state, in which the only relevant premium
adjustment was to pay a separate rate for disabled and non-
disabled persons. Within those two categories, no premium ad-
justment was made to reflect the wide range of costs within the
categories:
Standard Medicaid practice is to pay plans a percentage
(e.g., 95 percent) of the fee-for-service (FFS) average,
adjusted in some States for age, gender, and region. For
example, in Colorado in 1994, the FFS average for AFDC
adults was $1,646 per year, and for recipients with dis-
ability, $4,763 per year. If a health plan were somehow
able to attract members only from the one-fifth of AFDC
adults who were least costly in 1993, the next year the
plan could expect to make a profit on each enrollee of
$963, or 59 percent of capitation .... Conversely, if the
plan attracted members only from the most expensive one-
fifth of AFDC adults, it would expect to lose $831 per en-
rollee, or one-half of the capitation. The potential profits
and losses for recipients with disabilities are much larger,
because of the higher costs involved and because of the
much greater predictability. A plan attracting members
only from the least expensive one-fifth of recipients with
disability in 1993 would earn profits of $4,021 per mem-
ber, or 84 percent of the capitation; a plan enrolling from
the most expensive one-fifth would expect to lose $9,736
per member, or more than twice the capitation. 61
has on health care services utilization); Horwitz & Stein, supra note 13, at 581 (dis-
cussing successful methods HMOs use in limiting medical care expenditures).
61 Richard Kronick et al., Diagnostic Risk Adjustment for Medicaid: The Dis-
ability Payment System, HEALTH CARE FINANCING REV., Spring 1996, at 7, 9 (de-
scribing -a system of diagnostic categories that Medicaid programs can use for ad-
justing capitation payments to health plans that enroll people with disability").
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Not surprisingly, evidence suggests that plans have acted on the
obvious, enormous financial incentives to enroll the healthier
members of premium categories. 62 More subtly, plans can locate
physicians or facilities more or less accessibly to a disabled popu-
lation, avoid recruiting physicians with a loyal following among
high-risk chronically ill potential enrollees, or interpose barriers to
access to specialty care of particular interest to the chronically
ill. 63 Where price is sufficiently divorced from cost, then, "it is not
healthy for a plan's bottom line to have the reputation of having
the best cancer service in town."
64
The behavior of plans in excluding high-cost (including
chronically ill) enrollees encompasses both risk selection (the
avoidance by plans of the enrollment of an eligible person due to
high expected cost of coverage) and dumping (the failure of plans
to renew coverage, either overtly, or by discouraging the high-cost
member's choice to renew). A closely related problem for the
chronically ill is "stinting," the cost-avoiding behavior of managed
carflans in which the chronically ill are denied necessary serv-
ices. Denial of medically necessary care is not, of course, new
with managed care, as indemnity insurers and others have long had
62 See id. at 7-8 (discussing the necessity of risk adjustment for people with
disabilities because "expenditures are not only skewed but also much more predict-
able than expenditures for the non-disabled population"). See Newman et al., supra
note 8, at 138 (1998) ("Our research ... finds that, in general, Medicare HMO ads
appear to target physically sound and socially active seniors, but not beneficiaries in
relatively poor health or beneficiaries who are under age sixty-five and disabled");
Joseph P. Newhouse, Patients at Risk: Health Reform and Risk Adjustment, HEALTH
AFF., Spring 1994, at 132, 137 (discussing marketing practices including targeting
healthy enrollees and offering "tie-ins," such as free health club memberships).
63 See Context for a Changing Medicare Program, supra note 7, at 150-51 (dis-
cussing strategies that affect plan enrollment and the use of risk adjustment); see also
Carol Lee & Deborah Rogal, ALPHA CENTER, RISK ADJUSTMENT: A KEY TO
CHANGING INCENTIVES IN THE HEALTH INSURANCE MARKET 7 (1997) (discussing the
selection methods used by insurers to attract people who are better health risks, de-
spite insurance reforms designed to require insurers to accept risks they might other-
wise have avoided); Newhouse et al., supra note 7, at 26, 28 (discussing the access
problems, expensive efforts to attract good risks, and risk-adjustment deficits caused
by the lack of adequate risk-adjustment).
64 Newhouse et al., supra note 7, at 28.
65 The term "stinting" is borrowed from Newhouse et al., supra note 7, at 27.
Some MCO behavior could be regarded as either excluding or stinting, such as when
an MCO refuses, on ,a sustained basis, to provide appropriate referrals to specialty
care. The denial of such care is important independent of its effect in causing enrol-
lees to exit (or, on the basis of a plan's reputation, not enrolling in) a plan, as individ-
ual enrollees are, through stinting, denied medically necessary, covered services. See
infra text accompanying notes 72-74.
1999]
HEALTH MATRIX
(and acted on) incentives to deny care.66 The movement of high-
utilizing chronically ill enrollees to managed care highlights the
concern, however. As is described above, MCOs have both a
greater incentive to reduce utilization and a wide array of organ-
izational tools to do so. 67 The great paradox of the application of
managed care principles to the chronically ill is that, while MCOs
are programmatically capable of providing the coordination of
primary and specialty medical care, nursing care, home care, and
social services so needed by the chronically ill, they are financially
structured to foster incentives to withhold just that care.6 These
cost-containing incentives may be felt with particular severity by
the chronically ill, as utilization decisions may favor more familiar
preventive and acute services over long-term chronic care.69 For
example, while early intervention and treatment may facilitate a
rapid cure of acute conditions, and thereby save money for the
plan, the chronically ill typically need care rather than cure, and
66 See Bedrick v. Travelers Insurance Company, 93 F.3d 149, 154 (4th Cir.
1996) (reversing an ERISA plan administrator's refusal, on medical necessity
grounds, to provide physical therapy to a spastic quadriplegic infant); Zuckerbrod v.
Phoenix Mutual Life Ins., 78 F.3d 46, 49 (2d Cir. 1995) (reversing ERISA plan ad-
ministrator's refusal, on medical necessity grounds, to provide 24-hour private duty
nursing); Weaver v. Reagen, 886 F.2d 194, 200 (8th Cir. 1989) (reversing, on statu-
tory grounds, Missouri's Medicaid program's refusal to cover AZT as treatment of
HIV disease). See generally Mark A. Hall et al., Judicial Protection of Managed
Care Consumers: An Empirical Study of Insurance Coverage Disputes, 26 SETON
HALL L. REv. 1055 (1996) (using "content analysis" to analyze judicial holdings of
health insurance coverage disputes).
67 See supra text accompanying notes 23-31 (describing how MCOs control
costs by creating incentives for providers to economize, through mechanisms such as
capitation, performance bonuses, and economic credentialing).
68 See Context for a Changing Medicare Program, supra note 7, at 144-45 (dis-
cussing the organizational structure of MCOs and the pros and cons of providing
services, based on this structure, to the chronically ill); see also Horwitz & Stein,
supra note 13, at 581 (discussing how HMOs depend on "low utilization of high-cost
services for economic solvency"). See generally infra text accompanying notes 102-
11 (discussing the irony that managed care plans, which are particularly suited to
providing care to chronically ill patients, are designed to exclude them from cover-
age, or stint their coverage when included, in order to lower costs).
69 See Kuhlthau et al., supra note 12, at 43 ("Managed care may improve
comprehensiveness of care and coordination among providers of care for children
with chronic conditions and their families. However, the cost control strategies asso-
ciated with managed care may reduce access and quality for children with chronic
conditions more than they do for children without such conditions") (footnote omit-
ted).
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the rapid provision of treatment therefore entails lesser fiscal pay-
back."
From the perspective of the chronically ill consumer, then, a
move to a managed care system of finance poses the dual threats of
excluding - by which a plan of choice may be more or less overtly
unavailable, and stinting - by which a plan denies medically ap-
propriate care. It is obvious that this behavior would be harmful to
the chronically ill. By definition, excluding denies them access to
plans, and stinting denies them access to appropriate care should
they become members of plans. Should those who are not chroni-
cally ill - at least not yet7' - care about whether the tendencies for
excluding and stinting are realized? There are three reasons they
should care. First, they should be guided by humanitarian impulses
to care about the treatment of the chronically ill. Second, they
should be concerned about the loss - in money and opportunity -
visited on public and private plans by the disparate treatment of
the chronically ill. And third, they should be concerned because
poor health care for the chronically ill by MCOs provides a fore-
cast of poor treatment of the non-chronically ill who will never-
theless inevitably require specialty or acute care at some point, and
will depend on their plans to be there when the need arises. These
three reasons to care are discussed in turn.
We should be concerned about the care of the chronically ill,
first, for basic humanitarian reasons. It is simply wrong for the
chronically ill, who face the personal and non-medical costs of
addressing long-term conditions, 72 to in addition be badly treated
70 See Horwitz & Stein, supra note 13, at 581 (generally explaining how HMOs
are not structured to provide cost-effective care to the chronically ill).
71 See Jennings et al., supra note 7, at 5 (stating that "[c]hronic care for all who
need it in an aging society will place enormous demands on an already exceedingly
costly health care system. Now and in the future it may be said that virtually every-
one will suffer from a chronic illness at some time during their lives").
72 A concise description of this phenomenon is provided in Jennings et al., supra
note 7, at 6.
For the individual perhaps the most salient general feature of chronic ill-
ness is the transformation it causes in the texture of personal and social
life. The person is thrust into unfamiliar and often inhospitable worlds -
frequent hospital stays and encounters with highly complex, impersonal,
and often frightening modes of acute medical treatment; prolonged and in-
convenient regimens of medication, special exercise, and restricted diet; a
continuing round of bureaucratic hassles with a disjointed system of medi-
cal and social service professionals and agencies; the daily prospect of
sometimes disabling pain; the perpetual uncertainty that comes from the
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by the MCO obliged to provide them with health care. This is a
separate point from the more politically charged issue of entitle-
ment to coverage.73 This Article, notwithstanding Buchanan's
quite properly impassioned plea to the contrary, does not examine
the problems of the uninsured. The simple point here is that, once
a class of persons has been promised defined health coverage by
contract, employee benefit plan, or statute, the chronically ill
members of that class should, like all other class members, be af-
forded the benefit of that bargain. 74
intermittent flair-ups of debilitating symptoms and the occasional on-
slaught of an acute, life-threatening episode.
Id.
73 Philospher Allen Buchanan takes to task the sort of article - perhaps includ-
ing this one - in which the ethics of managed care are debated to the exclusion of the
ethics of neglect by this nation's leadership of the 40 million or more with no health
coverage at all:
mhe motivation for moving to managed care on the part of those whose
efforts actually brought it about had nothing to do with addressing what
might be called the primary access problem. By the primary access prob-
lem, I mean the fact that over 40 million people in the United States lack
secure access to anything other than emergency care because they have no
private health insurance and are not covered by any government program.
Indeed, what is most remarkable about the vociferous popular debate about
managed care - from an ethical point of view - is that the issue of access
for the uninsured seems to have dropped off the public's radar screen en-
tirely.
Allen Buchanan, Managed Care: Rationing Without Justice, But Not Unjustly, 23 J.
HEALTH POL. PoL'Y & L., 617, 620 (1998).
74 See Loretta M. Kopelman & Michael G. Palumbo, The U.S. Health Delivery
System: Inefficient and Unfair to Children, 23 AM J.L. & MED. 319, 322 (1997) (dis-
cussing David Hume's theory of distributive justice, based in part on his assumption
of the presence of "limited benevolence," by which "most humans, when they are
disinterested, had some limited concern for others"). In other words, we should care
about bad health policy toward the chronically ill because we should care about the
chronically ill. Society's concern in this regard should spring from the same humani-
tarian impulses that lay behind the broad public funding, through Medicaid and
Medicare, for the permanently and totally disabled. See 42 U.S.C.A. §§
1396a(a)(10)(A)(i)(V), 1396a(m)(1) (1992) (dealing with Medicaid, specifically the
description of individuals covered and plans for medical assistance); 42 U.S.C.A. §
1395c (1992) (describing individuals qualified to receive Medicare funds), 42
U.S.C.A. § 1395(c) (West Supp. 1998) (describing hospital and medical expenses
paid in the form of Medicare); see also Hoffman et al., supra note 7, at 1477 (stating
that, while public funds covered over 40% of direct health care costs for persons with
chronic conditions in 1987, they paid for less than 20% of costs for persons with
acute conditions. But, while private insurance covered about 45% for persons with
acute conditions, it paid only one-third of costs for persons with chronic conditions);
Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (stating a broad social
obligation to "reasonably accommodate" the disabled by offering them affirmative
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The second reason for concern is the fiscal version of the first.
The cost of treating the chronically ill is large, dwarfing the cost of
providing preventive care or episodic acute care.75 If managed
care-based health financing is to fulfill its end of the bargain, it
must provide high quality care to the chronically ill at a low cost
76
- a feat it has not demonstrated itself able to accomplish.77 The
cost, however, is not just large - it is also predictable. This feature
raises its own set of concerns. "Privatization," for purposes of this
discussion, has previously been described as the mechanism by
which government or an employer cedes to an MCO the basic re-
sponsibilities of provider network formation, maintenance, and
assistance unavailable to others). See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (1998) (requiring
employers to make reasonable workplace accommodations to an employee or appli-
cant who is disabled). See also President's Statement on Signing the Americans With
Disabilities Act of 1990, 26 WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Doc. 1165 (July 30, 1990) (recog-
nizing the goal of the Americans With Disabilities Act as assisting the disabled to
participate fully in society). This humanitarian impulse should be spurred by real
empathy, if not self-interest, among the "temporarily able-bodied." See Jennings et
al., supra note 7, at 5 (stating, "Now and in the future it may be said that virtually
everyone will suffer from a chronic illness at some time during their lives").
This is not to suggest that MCOs should be compensated at less than a fair
basis for the coverage. Indeed, it is critically important that financial arrangements
not create a barrier to coverage for the chronically ill. See infra Part III (discussing
regulatory steps needed to protect the clinicially ill). But once a governmental or
employment-based program promises coverage, and an MCO accepts a deal to treat
similarly for coverage purposes people with disparate health histories, all involved
have accepted the price and ought to deliver equally to the well and the ill.
7s See Hoffman et al., supra note 7, at 1476-77 (stating that "[w]hile 46% of
persons reported chronic conditions, they accounted for 76% of the direct medical
care costs in the United States in 1987").
76 Relative to the cost of other forms of health care financing, that is. It would,
of course, be unreasonable to expect managed care-based systems to eliminate the
disparity in cost between the treatment of those with and without chronic illness. See
id., at 1478 (citing reasons such as per capita costs of those with chronic conditions
being three times the costs of those without chronic conditions, high utilization rates,
and declining mortality rates across the entire lifespan that make persons with chronic
conditions less attractive to more comprehensive managed care programs).
77 See Neff & Anderson, supra note 8, at 1869 (discussing the difficulties that
managed care plans have in attempting to provide cost-effective health care to
chronically ill children); Paul W. Newachek et al., Children With Chronic Illness and
Medicaid Managed Care, 93 PEDIATRICs 497, 500 (1994) (describing the need for
states to assess the effects of managed care on chronically ill children); Horwitz &
Stein, supra note 13, at 586 (concluding from the author's study that the ability of
HMOs to care for the chronically ill "may be more a myth than a panacea"); but see
Edward H. Yelin et al., Health Care Utilization and Outcomes Among Persons With
Rheumatoid Arthritis in Fee-for-Service and Prepaid Group Practice Settings, 276
JAMA 1048, 1052-53 (1996) (comparing the similarities in the health care services
provided to chronically ill patients under fee-for-service and HMO health plans).
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compensation. 78 MCOs are simply paid a per capita sum - often
uniform, or nearly so7 9 - and are entrusted 8° to balance appropri-
ately tensions among the quality, cost, and access to care.8 1 The
cost of coverage for the chronically ill, however, is dramatically
high, and predictably so. MCOs will therefore profit greatly from
acting on this advanced notice of cost, accepting the nearly uni-
form rate, and predominantly enrolling the below-average risk. If
acted upon, this understandable business inclination would subvert
the bargain. MCOs often bargain to accept self-selecting members
of a group of, e.g., employees, or Medicaid or Medicare benefici-
aries, in return for a per capita sum. When an MCO enters into
such a deal, and then avoids enrolling the portion of the relevant
population whose cost is likely to exceed the per capita rate, se-
lecting predominantly those whose cost is likely to be below the
per capita rate, the payer loses in two ways.
Initially, the payer is simply overcharged. It offered a rate
based on the average expected cost of the entire group on the as-
sumption that the risk profile of those enrolled by an MCO would
more or less reflect that group-wide average. If the risk profile of
those enrolled by the MCO, by virtue either of group members'
self-selection or the MCO's manipulation of the enrollment proc-
ess, drops significantly below the group's average, the MCO gains
a windfall. That windfall is at the payer's expense if the payer
permits group members to choose between an MCO and a form of
coverage, such as self-insured fee-for-service, in which the payer
is directly responsible for the medical costs of the residual mem-
bers with above-average risk. The MCO would be skimming the
cream, charging full price, and leaving the payer with the most
costly cases. 82
78 See supra text accompanying notes 23-31 (defining "privatization").
79 See Dowd et al., supra note 8, at 35 (describing limited demographic adjust-
ments in Medicare's capitation payments to HMOs); see also Nicholas A. Hanchak et
al., U.S. Healthcare's Quality-Based Compensation Model, HEALTH CARE FINANCING
REV. Spring 1996, at 143, 144 (describing limited demographic adjustments in pri-
vatejlan's subcapitation payments to primary care physicians).
Not that the trust is complete, of course. See infra Part III.B (describing
structural regulation of MCOs).
81 See Randall S. Brown et al., Do Health Maintenance Organizations Work for
Medicare?, HEALTH CARE FINANCING REV., Fall 1993, at 7-8 (evaluating whether
HMO treatment of Medicare patients has actually decreased Medicare costs).
82 Medicare beneficiaries, for example, are free to choose managed care cover-
age, other types of "privatized" plans, including managed care plans, or to remain in
the traditional public fee-for-service system. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-21 (1998) (de-
scribing the eligibility, election, and enrollment rules for Medicare+Choice). While
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But the payer loses in an additional, perhaps less obvious
way. Cream-skimming not only deprives payers of the anticipated
benefit of their bargains, but also deprives them of the opportunity
to trim costs by shifting the health management of their expensive,
chronically ill members to managed care. Along with its potential
to harm the chronically ill, managed care holds the structural po-
tential to provide care both more appropriately and more effi-
ciently than fee-for-service care. Managed care can knit together
disparate services needed by the chronically ill, creatively en-
hancing primary and home care services that are at the heart of
chronic care. 83 And the capitated financing frequently used in
managed care provides MCOs with the financial incentives to em-
ploy a wide range of medical and non-medical services, as such
broad-spectrum services are often the least costly, as well as the
most appropriate means of treating chronic illness.84 Managed
care, then, is structurally capable of providing the chronically ill
with cost-efficient, effective care. But the tremendous cost of even
economically covering the chronically ill,85 and self-selection
many states are moving toward managed care for Medicaid beneficiaries, some allow
beneficiaries, and in particular the chronically ill, to opt for fee-for-service coverage,
either at their own election, or if they can meet "opt out" requirements. The Federal
government permits states to "require an individual who is eligible for medical assis-
tance under the State plan... to enroll with a managed care entity as a condition of
receiving such assistance . . . ." 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396u-2(a)(1)(A)(i) (West Supp.
1998). States' authority in this regard, however, is not unlimited. For example, a state
may not require certain disabled children or children in foster care to enroll in a man-
aged care entity. 42 U.S.C. 1396u-2(a)(2)(A). States could, however, presumably
make managed care enrollment optional for such beneficiaries. Finally, many public
employers and large private employers offer an array of health plans, and permit
employees to choose from among those plans on an annual basis. See Henry T.
Greely, Policy Issues in Health Alliances: Of Efficiency, Monopsony, and Equity, 5
HEALTH MATRIX 37, 46-47 (1995) (stating that members of the California Public
Employee Retirement System who live in Los Angeles and the San Francisco Bay
Area may choose among more than ten different health plans); see generally Bradley
W. Joondeph, Tax Policy and Health Care Reform: Rethinking the Tax Treatment of
Employer-Sponsored Health Insurance, 1995 BYU L. REv. 1229, 1229-30 (explain-
ing that § 106 of the Internal Revenue Cose subsidizes employee health benefits be-
yond what is necessary to accomplish the goals of affordable health care).
83 See Sandy & Gibson, supra note 7, at 12-13 (discussing the features of man-
aged care organizations that can improve the care of the chronically ill, including the
flexibility to devote resources to home- and community-based services).
84 See id. (explaining that managed care provides a capitated financing environ-
ment, creating a financial incentive to provide cost-effective care)
85 See Hoffman et al., supra note 7, at 1476 (citing the cost of covering the
chronically ill as being $272.2 billion in 1987).
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among group members, 86 has prevented a migration of high-risk
enrolles to managed care.87 Therefore, biased selection, in which
the chronically ill are not enrolled in managed care, may deprive
payers of the cost-saving potential for lowering the cost of chronic
care through managed care principles.
Medicare is the clearest example of this dual dilemma. As is
more fully described below,88 managed care has the apparent ca-
pacity to provide care to Medicare beneficiaries equivalent to, but
at a significantly lower cost than, that available through the fee-
for-service system. 89 However, Medicare has lost money on man-
aged care, as it has paid premiums to MCOs loosely tied to histori-
cal average beneficiary costs in the fee-for-service system, while
participating MCOs have enrolled substantially below-average
86 See Wilensky & Rossiter, supra note 8, at 68 ("In general, there seem to be
unique aspects patient self-selection for HMOs for which available studies are either
inconclusive or indicate favorable selection for HMOs").
87 See id. (noting that HMOs, on average, enroll low-risk patients). The effect is
most clear at the initial enrollment stage. Over time, the risk profile of enrollees in
managed care tend to move somewhat toward the average risk, although quite slowly.
See id. at 69-71 (describing regression toward the mean suggesting that, over time,
both lower and higher-than-average risks move toward the mean).
New enrollees in the Medicare managed-care plans appear quite healthy,
with costs that are about 35 percent below the Medicare fee-for-service av-
erage in the six months before enrollment. By contrast, beneficiaries disen-
rolling from managed-care plans had costs 60 percent higher than the
Medicare fee-for-service average in the six months following disenroll-
ment. The good health of new managed-care enrollees declines only slowly
after enrollment, taking perhaps eight years to approach the level of the av-
erage Medicare fee-for-service beneficiary.
Medicare Payment Advisory Comm'n, supra note 8, at 27.
88 See discussion infra and text accompanying notes 106-09 (explaining how
MCOs are well-suited to provide cost-effective health care for the chronically ill).
89 See Oberlander, supra note 60, at 610-11 (highlighting the costs and benefits
of using a managed care approach to Medicare with regard to quality of care).
90 See Dowd et al., supra note 8, at 36 (stating that HMO selectivity may raise
overall Medicare costs); MEDICARE MANAGED CARE: GROWING ENROLLMENT ADDS
URGENCY TO FIXING HMO PAYMENT PROBLEM, GAO/HEHS 96-21, at 3 (Nov. 8,
1995) (explaining the three-step process that HCFA uses to calculate the payment
rate to HMOs for Medicare beneficiaries). Medicare does exact a five percent dis-
count, and engages in some modest demographic adjustment to premiums. See Dowd
et al., supra note 8, at 35. It overpays nevertheless. See Wolf & Gorman, supra note
60, at 2-3 (noting that capitation amounts paid to HMOs by Medicare may be too
high since the HMO enrollees tend to be healthier than the average Medicare enrol-
lee). See infra text accompanying notes 112-28 (discussing circumstances under
which capitation rates encourage risk selection and the resulting search for adequate
risk adjusters).
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risks. 91 Simply stated, Medicare pays'as though MCOs will enroll a
broad spectrum of beneficiaries, from healthy to ill, while MCOs
have overwhelmingly enrolled the healthy. 92 Medicare, therefore,
takes a double hit: it overpays for those beneficiaries who elect
managed care, and it is left with direct responsibility for the bulk
of high-risk beneficiaries, who could, at least in theory, enjoy
more appropriately coordinated care at a lower cost in a managed
care system.
93
The third reason for concern is a bit counterintuitive. MCOs,
by design, reduce utilization. Consumers' unease with managed
care stems from their lack of confidence that such reductions will
be done in a manner that assures them of access to the care they
need, when the need arises. 94 As the chronically ill need acute and
specialty services much more frequently than the well, the chroni-
cally ill can serve as "canaries in the coal mine," as society moni-
tors their treatment by MCOs for clues as to how the well will be
treated. We value health coverage at least in pare5 because it
promises us coverage for expensive, medically necessary acute
care. Managed care plans, to a greater or lesser extent, restrict
utilization and control the setting in which care is given. Consum-
ers, then, are increasingly concerned that this management of their
care not deprive them of necessary care, and that the care they are
provided be of acceptably high quality.9 By definition, the well
91 The Inspector General of the Department of Health and Human Services re-
cently asserted that Medicare overpays in a different, more straight-forward way as
well. The Inspector General reported that Medicare paid between 23.5 and 31.7% of
the administrative expenses of Medicare-participating HMOs in recent years, while
Medicare enrollees constituted only between 7.5 and 8.9% of the HMOs' enrollees.
In one case, the Inspector General reported that a plan with 43% Medicare enrollees
collected 127% of its administrative costs from Medicare. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND
HUMAN SERVICES, OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS SUBMITTED
By RISK-BASED HEALTH MAINTENANCE ORGANIZATIONS ON THE ADJUSTED
COMMUNITY RATE PROPOSALS ARE HIGHLY INFLATED 9 (1998).
92 See Oberlander, supra note 60, at 606-07 (explaining the options and money-
savinf techniques that MCOs use to attract healthy members).
See id. at 607 (showing the cost savings potential of managed care system for
Medicare).
94 See Moran, supra note 32, at 21 (showing that most Americans are skeptical
about access to potentially needed health care services when it comes to managed
care).
95 We also value health care coverage for the access it provides for routine pre-
ventive care. This aspect of health coverage is not really "insurance" at all, but rather
prep~nent for expected, periodic costs.
See Moran, supra note 32, at 20-21 (analyzing the prospects for workable
federal regulation of managed care).
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rarely need specialized or acute care; how, then, are they to judge
whether a health plan will do the job correctly when the need
arises? There are two developing forms of such assurance for con-
sumers that offer some promise. These embryonic forms are direct
government regulation of managed care,97 and "market-based"
regulation, through the measurement and public disclosure (often
by private entities) of the quality of care offered by MCOs.98 A
common thread that runs through these emerging forms of con-
sumer protection is the belief that the selective testing of MCOs
for performance against quality measures will permit better gov-
ernment licensure enforcement on the one hand, and better infor-
mation to support consumer choice on the other.99 But the aspects
of measured performance are dominated by primary care indica-
tors, with a few acute care and, recently, chronic care indicators
added.1°° The science of such measurement, while promising, re-
mains confused. In the words of one leader in the field, "today's
[MCO quality] measures are, to be blunt, expensive, incomplete,
and distorting. And, unless great care is taken, they can easily be
inaccurate and misleading."' 0'1 Monitoring plan performance with
current tools, then, is unlikely to inform consumers of their plans'
ability to provide extensive acute or specialty care.
The chronically ill, in contrast with the run-of-the-mill MCO
member, regularly needs a wide array of health interventions,
ranging from the significant acute care procedure to routine, on-
going outpatient therapy. An assessment of the performance of a
plan in providing treatment for the chronically ill, then, can pro-
vide in a concentrated form an indicator of the plan's ability to
97 See id. at 15-16 (noting that there are conflicting conclusions regarding the
ability of the marketplace to regulate managed care in the absence of federal inter-
vention); see also Judith G. Waxman & Geraldine Dallek, Hit and Miss: State Man-
aged Care Laws <http://www.familiesusa.org/HlTl.HTM> (visited Mar. 10, 1999)
(analyzing common problems experienced by managed care consumers and discuss-
ing recent consumer protections that have been enacted by state legislatures).
98 See Furrow, supra note 19, at 396-404 (discussing private accreditation, spe-
cifically the merits of NCQA accreditation); see also Jacobi, supra note 27, at 766-73
(discussing various forms of quality assurance systems by private entities and gov-
ernment agencies).
99 See Furrow, supra note 19, at 396-97 (discussing the benefits of private ac-
creditation of health care institutions).
1oo See Kuhlthau et al., supra note 12, at 45 (discussing the weaknesses of meth-
ods used to assess managed care for children with chronic illnesses, specifically, the
lack of descriptors of service that apply to children with chronic conditions).
101 David M. Eddy, Performance Measurement: Problems and Solutions,
HEALTH Are., July-Aug. 1998, at 7, 16.
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provide medically necessary care of an acceptably high quality.
The high utilization of services by the chronically ill permit them
to be sensitive barometers of the performance of a plan - to be
"'canaries in the coal mine." By closely monitoring the care a plan
provides to the chronically ill, the broader community can rea-
sonably infer the level of quality all members will receive when
they need care. The ability of a plan to manage the care of a person
with serious heart disease, brittle diabetes, or cystic fibrosis may
provide a window on how the plan would treat a heart attack, a
significant infection, or a cancer.
There are, then, three reasons we should care about how well
the chronically ill fare under managed care. Our concern should
spring from human concern for the proper care of the insured
chronically ill; from a preference that payers, including state and
federal government, receive the cost savings that form the basis of
their bargain with MCOs; and from a desire to use MCOs' per-
formance with the chronically ill to inform the general population
of the MCOs' likely performance in providing high-quality spe-
cialty and acute care. The following section addresses the avail-
able and contemplated regulatory means available to secure the
benefit of the managed care bargain for the coverage of the chroni-
cally ill. These regulatory measures are aimed at controlling or
eliminating excluding and stinting behavior by MCOs. As the fol-
lowing section describes, however, regulatory measures may differ
in the relative importance they assign to controlling excluding or
stinting behavior. The difference may arise depending on which of
the three reasons for concern motivate the regulatory impulse. For
example, concern for payers' spending may result in great concern
for excluding, because excluding so clearly cheats payers. On the
other hand, concern for the chronically ill themselves, either on
humanitarian grounds or as "testers" for the benefit of society, will
place a relatively higher value on controlling stinting, as that be-
havior more clearly and immediately threatens consumer well-
being. At any rate, an impressive armamentarium is amassed to
regulate excluding and stinting; unfortunately, it is far from clear
that these regulatory measures offer, alone or in combination, more
than partial proof against these transgressions.
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I. SQUARING THE CIRCLE: PIECEMEAL
REGULATORY STEPS TO PROTECT THE
CHRONICALLY ILL
A system for the regulation' °2 of managed care for the benefit
of the chronically ill must respond to a central paradox. The para-
dox arises from the nature of MCOs as both financing (and there-
fore naturally risk-assessing) entities, and care giving entities.103
The paradox is that the care giving aspect of managed care is ca-
pable of curing the discontinuous and fragmented provision of the
care historically experience by the chronically ill, including over-
emphasis on institutional care.1°4 At the same time, however, the
financing aspect of managed care inclines plans and plan providers
to exclude the chronically ill, and to stint on care delivery when
they are enrolled.105
On the one hand, the organizational structure of MCOs seems
ideally suited to provide the chronically ill the broad range of care
they need in a well-planned fashion. First, MCOs central organi-
zation permits - indeed, enforces - a great deal of coordination
among the varied providers the chronically ill must consult. °6
Second, "capitated financing allows reallocation of resources to
102 "Regulation" in this context refers to both public and private mechanisms to
shape the behavior of MCOs. Many of the mechanisms described in this section, e.g.,
risk adjustment and quality measurement, are and will be practiced through private
initiatives as well as through direct government intervention.
103 See Buchanan, supra note 73, at 619 ("A managed care organization com-
bines health care insurance and the delivery of a broad range of integrated health care
services for populations of plan enrollees, financing the services prospectively from a
predicted, limited budget").
104 See Context for a Changing Medicare Program, supra note 7, at 144-45 (stat-
ing that the numerous advantages available to the chronically ill through an MCO);
see also Horowitz & Stein, supra note 13, at 581 (explaining how HMOs could pro-
vide comprehensive medical services to chronically ill children, and also minimize
institutional care and fragmented delivery systems); Sandy & Gibson, supra note 7, at
12-13 (describing how managed care systems have the capacity to "overcome the
fragmentation of a poorly organized fee-for-service sector" while allowing resources
to be devoted to home- and community-based services).
105 See Context for a Changing Medicare Program, supra note 7, at 145 (showing
that MCOs traditionally provide care through primary care physicians and this may
present challenges to a MCO confronted with the special care, supportive care, and
non-medical social services needs of a chronically ill member); see also Horwitz &
Stein, supra note 13, at 581 (explaining how there is little economic incentive for
HMOs to care for individuals wih chronic illnesses, due to the long-term nature of
such conditions).
106 See Sandy & Gibson, supra note 7, at 12 (discussing how "[e]ffective systems
use multi-disciplinary teams to provide integrated care" to the chronically ill).
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better meet the needs of persons with chronic conditions." 107 That
is, MCOs can provide services creatively, without the constraints
imposed by rigidly defined benefits limits. Third, to the extent less
intensive care such as home care and social support is more cost-
effective than institutional care, MCOs' treatment planning is not
distorted toward expensive settings for care as are treatment plans
generated in a fee for service environment. 1°8 And fourth, MCOs
are commonly rich in primary care options, and are therefore likely
to be institutionally suited to provide the types of care most fre-
quently needed by the chronically ill. 109
On the other hand, the financing system at the heart of man-
aged care is at war with its care-giving potential when it comes to
the chronically ill. In particular, the capitation rates offered to
MCOs, in systems where the plan does not contract for the entire
group, but rather self-selecting members of the group, may be suf-
ficiently uneconomic to lead the plan to select against the chroni-
cally ill." 0 And when plans enroll the chronically ill, the financial
incentives used by the plans may disincline the plan's providers
from realizing the potential of the plan's network."I
Faced with this paradox, the regulatory system seeks to cor-
rect for the undesired aspects of managed care - excluding and
stinting - without disabling MCOs from providing cost-effective,
well-integrated care. In the following pages I outline several cur-
rent or developing means of regulating managed care, and assess
their ability to control excluding and stinting behavior.
' ' Id. at 12.
log See id. at 12-13 (reviewing opportunities to use alternate care environments to
efficiently care for the chronically ill).
109 See id. at 13 (explaining how a system of "generalist physicians, nurse practi-
tioners, and other health providers" is the most appropriate way to care for the
chronically ill).
110 See Context for a Changing Medicare Program, supra note 7, at 150-51 (dis-
cussing the economics of enrolling the chronically ill, and stating that, beginning in
the year 2000, new risk adjustment methods will be used. These new methods will
reflect the enrollee's health status in order to compensate for the current variations in
individual beneficiaries' health care costs); Neff & Anderson, supra note 8, at 1867
(discussing Medicaid programs and explaining that "plans that attract proportionally
more chronically ill children would need to raise their rates to 'emain financially
solvent").
111 See Blum, supra note 1, at 175-76 (discussing how, under capitation health
care, the expansion of the plan may bring increased harm to patients and increased
liability to individuals and the plan itself); see also Horwitz & Stein, supra note 13, at
581 (stating that "there is little incentive within HMOs for providers to care for those
individuals who, because of their medical conditions, must constantly return for
medical intervention or time-consuming supervision and support").
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A. Risk Adjustment
Capitation rates in systems where optional member enrollment
can result in risk selection are usually average payment rates,
pegged to experience under fee-for-service, moderated slightly by
demographic characteristics. For example, Medicare's rate, known
as AAPCC, for "adjusted average per capita cost," begins with a
rate equal to 95 percent of the average regional fee-for-service for
a Medicare patient. 2 The actual rate paid is adjusted by employ-
ing "30 cells: 5 age groups, 2 sex categories, and 3 institutional
status groups (institutionalized, welfare recipient not institutional-
ized, and neither)."'1 3 While this demographic adjustment is in-
tended to vary payment rates to correspond to an enrollee's actual
health costs, the application of current demographic adjusters ex-
plains only "about 1 percent of the variance in actual spending."
114
As insurers will always benefit by accurately risk-selecting in light
of the offered premium, " 5 and as factors, such as the enrollee's
prior year's utilization experience," 6 explaining at least a portion
of the balance of the variation are readily (if not lawfully) 17 avail-
able to MCOs, there is at least a risk that they will act on that in-
formation."18 In fact, risk selection clearly occurs, although the
mechanism is not clear." 9 Risk adjustment as a correction to the
tendency toward risk-selection has been examined for use in Medi-
care,' 20 Medicaid, 21 and private insurance. '2
112 See Dowd et al., supra note 8, at 35 (noting that the purpose of the AAPCC
system is to adjust HMOs payment rates in accordance with demographics of enrol-
lees).
"13 Id.
114 See Newhouse et al., supra note 7, at 30.
15 See ABRAHAM, supra note 55, at 11-12 (discussing the difference between
risk neutrality and risk aversion in the relation between insurance and economic effi-
ciency, and noting that risk-averse individuals will always pay more than their ex-
pected loss and, by satisfying this demand for protection, insurance can work to in-
sure economic efficiency).
116 See Newhouse et al., supra note 7, at 31 (describing an element of the estima-
tion of the variance in expected spending from observations on actual spending).
"' See 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-22(b)(1)(A) (1998) (stating that a Medicare+Choice
organization "may not deny, limit, or condition the coverage or provision of benefits
under this part, for individuals permitted to be enrolled with the organization under
this hart, based on any health status-related factor...").
8 See Newhouse et al., supra note 7, at 31-32 (noting that there will never be a
perfect risk adjuster formula, but higher incentives to better adjust risk are needed).
119 See Medicare Payment Advisory Comm'n, supra note 8, at 27 (noting that
studies have repeatedly demonstrated that risk selection occurs under Medicare).
120 See Leslie M. Greenwald et al., Risk Adjustment for the Medicare Program"
Lessons Learned from Research and Demonstrations, 35 INQUIRY 193, 195-97 (1998)
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"Risk adjustment is the process of setting capitation rates that
reflect health status, paying plans more to care for ill beneficiaries
and less to care for healthy ones."' 23 To the extent the risk selec-
tion currently experienced in managed care is a function of ex-
cluding,' 24 risk adjustment to narrow the gap between the offered
price and the plans' actuarial judgments as to expected cost are
seen as a critical means of narrowing the enrollment gap, particu-
larly for the chronically ill. 125 Because future costs for this group;
[A]re more predictable, health plans can more easily en-
gage in risk selection, enrolling low cost beneficiaries as
members and avoiding high costs ones. A plan has an in-
centive to avoid excelling in care for people with disabili-
ties and chronic conditions for fear that developing a good
(discussing research to develop risk adjusters for Medicare managed care payments);
see also Jonathan P. Weiner et al., Risk-Adjusted Medicare Capitation Rates Using
Ambulatory and Inpatient Diagnoses, HEALTH CARE FINANCING REV., Spring 1996, at
77, 97-98 (discussing diagnostic-based methodologies for calculating risk-adjusted
capitated premiums for Medicare enrollees); Medicare Managed Care: Growing En-
rollment Adds Urgency to Fixing HMO Payment Problem, GAO/HEHS 96-21, at 14
(Nov. 1995) (citing research evaluating 10 possible risk adjusters).
121 See John Holahan et al., Medicaid Managed Care in Thirteen States, HEALTH
AFF., May-June 1998, at 43, 57 (examining states that have adopted a form of Medi-
caid managed care, and the different manners in which some have been handling risk
adjustment); see also Laura Tollen & Michael Rothman, Case Study: Colorado
Medicaid HMO Risk Adjustment, 35 INQUIRY 154, 159-64 (1998) (examining the risk
adjustments of the Colorado Medicaid HMO system and how they effect budgeting);
Kronick et al., supra note 61, at 28-30 (discussing the use of diagnostic approaches to
risk adjust capitated payment for Medicare and Medicaid beneficiaries).
122 See Daniel L. Dunn, Applications of Health Risk Adjustment: What Can Be
Learned From Experience to Date?, 35 INQUIRY 132, 137-39 (1998) (discussing the
implementation of health status risk-adjusted payments by the Minneapolis Buyers
Health Care Action Group); John Bertko & Sandra Hunt, Case Study: The Health
Insurance Plan of California, 35 INQUIRY 148, 149-52 (1998) (addressing the impact
of implementation of risk adjustment to the Health Insurance Plan of California); see
generally Fowles et al., supra note 6, at 1316 (finding that adjusting capitation rates
based on health status, rather than demographic measures, worked best to result in
fair capitation payments to physicains).
123 Medicare Payment Advisory Comm'n, supra note 8, at 27 (defining risk ad-
justment).
124 Excluding, that is, by either explicitly refusing to enroll or re-enroll a high-
risk person, or by declining to undertake program development that would make a
plan more attractive to high-risk persons.
125 See Context for a Changing Medicare Program, supra note 7, at 150 (stating
that, without adjustments, MCOs will have strong incentives to select low-cost mem-
bers).
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reputation in such care will lead to adverse selection as
more such members enroll. 1
26
The desire to solve this problem has driven a long search for accu-
rate and fair risk adjusters. 127 Congress has provided new urgency
to the search, requiring that Medicare report a risk adjustment
methodology to Congress by March 1, 1999, and implement "a risk
adjustment methodology that accounts for variations in per capita
costs based on health status and other demographic factors for
payments by ... January 1, 2000."'12
Much work has been done to develop acceptable risk adjust-
ers, although none has yet emerged as the "holy grail."' 29 A very
wide array of risk adjustment have been investigated and subjected
to statistical scrutiny, a full discussion of which is beyond the
scope of this Article.13° The competing methodologies attempt to
126 Id. (Citations omitted).
127 See Randall P. Ellis et al., Diagnosis-Based Risk Adjustment for Medicare
Capitation Payments, HEALTH CARE FINANCING REV., Spring 1996, at 101, 101
(identifying numerous studies which indicate a preponderance of "cream skimming:
with experimental HMO-Medicare enrollees).
'2' 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396w-23(a)(3) (West Supp. 1998) (directing how payments to
Medicare+Choice organizations shall be made).
129 See Oberlander, supra note 60, at 622 ("Some risk-adjustment models have
attracted favorable interest, and it has been argued that the AAPCC can be fixed by
adding history-of-illness variables. However, risk adjustment remains a 'holy grail':
No risk-adjustment mechanism has successfully operated in practice, and Medicare's
own experience does not provide much reason for optimism that the technical barriers
can be easily overcome") (citations omitted).
130 See Oberlander, supra note 60 (analyzing the advantages and disadvantages to
using a managed care approach to Medicare); Newhouse et al., supra note 7 (dis-
cussing the lack of adequate risk adjustment and selection); Fowles et al., supra note
6, at 1316 (discussing the necessity of taking health status into account when setting
capitation rates, to avoid penalizing physicians who treat the sicker segment of the
population); Kronick et al., supra note 61 (describing different diagnostic categories
that could be used by Medicaid programs to determine payments to health care plans
enrolling disabled persons); Dowd et al., supra note 8 (examining the effect of
AAPCC Medicare enrollees on HMOs); Leonard Gruenberg et al., Improving the
AAPCC With Health-Status Measures from the MCBS, HEALTH CARE FINANCING
REV., Spring 1996, at 59 (examining the use of multiple regression-based models to
predict Medicare costs, incorporating demographic, diagnostic, perceived health, and
disability variables); Weiner et al., supra note 120, (summarizing the strengths and
complexity of various risk-adjuster models); Ellis et al., supra note 127 (developing,
estimating, and evaluating risk-adjustment models which use diagnostic information
from Medicare enrollees); Medicare: Changes to HMO Rate Setting Method Are
Needed to Reduce Program Costs, GAO/HEHS-94-119 (Sept. 2, 1994) (studying the
payment system used by Medicare's risk-contract program for HMOs and including
recommendations to make the program more cost-effective). There are a number of
works that provide greater information on the different models of risk adjustment
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attain a closer correspondence between the premium paid and the
cost experienced by adding factors such as a person's "single
highest cost principal inpatient diagnosis"; 131 the presence of one
of a few specified disabling conditions; 32 a person's inpatient and
outpatient diagnoses; 33 and an array of factors including "diag-
nostic characteristics, perceived health status and functional-
impairment information."'
' 34
How much of an improvement do these models show? It ap-
pears that the most powerful of these mechanisms, applied pro-
spectively - that is, to the next year's premium for the same per-
son 135 - explains about nine percent of the variance, which is to
say that it is about nine times as powerful a predictor of variance
from the average as the AAPCC system in use in Medicare. 36 Is
that enough? How powerful does a risk adjustment method have to
be to trim the incentives to exclude? Complete prediction of cost
variation is neither possible 137 nor necessary. First, the outright
prohibitions against risk selection by MCOs in many settings'
38
certainly have some effect on dampening the excluding behavior of
MCOs. 139 And second, risk adjustors need only be as good, at the
under consideration. See, e.g., Frank et al., supra note 58, at 115 (considering "the
potential for risk-adjusted premiums to attenuate selection incentives").
13t See Ellis et al., supra note 127, at 105 (describing one variant of the diagnos-
tic cost group - or DCG - model).
132 See Brown et al., supra note 81, at 19-20. (discussing that, by adding one
factor such as a history of cancer, heart disease, or stroke, to the adjusted average per
capita cost (AAFCC) payment rate formula, the increased costs to the Health Care
Financing Administration could be eliminated).
133 See Weiner et al., supra note 120, at 78-79 (discussing the effects of hospital
admissions and diagnoses on various risk-adjustment models).
34 Gruenberg et al., supra note 130, at 62.
35 See infra text accompanying notes 146-50 (discussing prospective versus
retrospective adjustment).
I See Newhouse et al., supra note 7, at 35 (regarding the hierarchical coexisting
conditions (HCCs) model as the most powerful mechanism for explaining variance
prosectively).
7 See Risk Adjustment: How Far Have We Come?, HEALTH CARE FINANCING &
ORG. NEWS & PROGRESS (Robert Wood Johnson Foundation), July 1998, at 1 (citing
Joseph P. Newhouse, speaking at a conference on risk adjustment, for the proposition
that "a perfect retrospective risk adjustment method will always elude us.").
'3 See Newman et al., supra note 8, at 132-33 (describing prohibitions against
the use of marketing materials by Medicare HMOs that attempt to select against the
ill or disabled).
1 But see id. at 138 (finding some current Medicare HMO materials misleading
in this regard).
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outer limit, as the plans' own ability to estimate risk variance.140
Professor Newhouse, a most thoughtful and lucid commentator on
this issue, has suggested a "lower bound" of appropriate predictive
power as twenty to twenty-five percent of variation.1 41 This range
represents the amount of variation that can commonly be captured
by considering two factors: the presence of a permanent significant
condition such as a chronic illness, and the occurrence of an up-
ward departure in the previous year from the expected experience
(in light of the chronic illness). 42 This calculation is one that is
within the power of a risk-selecting plan, and a risk adjustment
methodology that captures this level of variation may "still" the
impulse to risk select. 43 After all, if the goal is to prevent exclud-
ing behavior, payers need only match the predictive power of the
plans. Some progress has been made. At least on paper, "a great
deal of progress has been made toward shifting health care dollars
around [through risk adjustment] in a way that makes the health
care system more accessible to sicker, more vulnerable popula-
tions. ' 144
The reference in the last quote to making the system "more
accessible" is telling. For much of the thrust of research into risk
adjustment is payer-driven, and focuses on limiting excluding,
rather than stinting behavior. 45 In fact, the discussion and evalua-
140 See ABRAHAM, supra note 55, at 78 (explaining that plans will reach a point
of diminished returns in risk assessment, where the cost of refining the assessment of
the potential enrollee's risk exceeds the benefit to the plan of learning that which the
more refined assessment would tell).
141 Newhouse et al., supra note 7, at 30-3 1.
142 See id.
143 See id. at 31-32. Professor Newhouse remains agnostic on this point, con-
cluding, "In short, a workable adjuster need not achieve the ideal. But how far from
perfection will be sufficient is unknown." Id. at 32. The question can be answered, in
all likelihood, only by experience, in which plan behavior, encouraged by risk adjust-
ers, cautioned by prohibitions against risk selection, and limited by the plans' techni-
cal ability to exceed the predictive power of the risk adjuster. For this reason, New-
house and others recommend implementation and testing of the methodologies now
available, at least on a pilot basis. Id. at 37; see also Oberlander, supra note 60, at
622 (exploring the risk plans and possible alternate solutions).
144 Risk Adjustment: How Far Have We Come?, supra note 137, at 1.
145 See Medicare Managed Care: Growing Enrollment Adds Urgency to Fixing
HMO Payment Problem, GAO/HEHS 96-21, at 9 ("Our review of studies on risk
selection show that, because most HMOs benefit from favorable selection ... Medi-
care has paid HMOs more than it would have paid for the same patients' care by fee-
for-service providers."); see also Bryan Dowd et al., supra note 79, at 3 (noting that
inadequate risk adjusters in Medicare result in "payment bias" and overpayment to
HMOs).
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tion of risk adjustment surfaces a tension between the desire on the
one hand to control excluding behavior, thereby permitting payers
to pay a fair premium, and the desire on the other hand to control
stinting behavior, thereby permitting chronically ill patients to re-
ceive appropriate care. This tension is most clearly displayed in
the debate over the relative merits of prospective and retrospective
adjusters.
Prospective adjusters test for the presence of some of cost-
sensitive demographic and diagnostic factors in a past period or
periods to set a premium level for an enrollee.' 46 Retrospective
adjusters use diagnostic and treatment information for the current
year to change, after the fact, the amount of the premium.147 Pro-
spective adjusters, then, are purely predictive, attempting to set in
advance premium rates that will make well and ill persons suffi-
ciently similar from a risk perspective to make them equally at-
tractive to plans. 48 Retrospective adjusters, on the other hand, at-
tempt to do more. They attempt to tie increased payment more
closely to actual services rendered, thereby encouraging not just
the enrollment, but the appropriate treatment of the chronically
ill.149 But this increased sensitivity comes at a cost. Permitting cur-
rent year treatment to affect current year premium permits a plan
to "game the system" by increasing care not simply for the benefit
of the enrollee, but to increase the capitation amount.
50
146 See Newhouse et al., supra note 7, at 34 (stating that the previous year's diag-
nostic information is usually used for prospective adjusters).147 Id. (defining "retrospective adjusters").
148 See id. (defining "prospective adjuster" and providing an example of the in-
formation used for setting reimbursement). As Newhouse explains, if the goal is to
avoid excluding, the risk adjustment mechanism need only do about as well at fore-
casting risk as could a plan's actuary. It need not be concerned with unforeseeable
risk, because, by definition, such risk would not factor into a plan's individual risk
analysis; "explaining random variation is not important for purposes of mitigating
selection behavior." Id.
149 See Medicare Patient Advisory Comm'n, 2 Report to Congress: Medicare
Payment Policy 25 (March 1998) (explaining some of the differences between pro-
sepective and concurrent risk adjustment by noting that "a high dependence of pay-
ment on service use may be a reflection of good performance of the risk adjuster. If
variations in use of care are due mainly to variations in health status, then a high
correlation of use and payment would be a desirable outcome of the risk-adjustment
process").
ISO See Ellis et al., supra note 127, at 124-25 (comparing prospective and concur-
rent (current year) risk adjustment models); see also Medicare Payment Advisory
Comm'n, supra note 149, at 25 (discussing how the use of concurrent risk adjustment
results in a "closer match of payments and costs, but allows a much greater share of
payment to depend on services actually performed by the plan").
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In some ways, the tension between prospective and retrospec-
tive risk adjusters goes to the heart of the bargain between payers
and MCOs. MCOs achieve price moderation in large part by ac-
cepting full control and responsibility for an enrollee's care in re-
turn for a fixed, prospective payment.15' To the extent risk adjust-
ment methods modify premiums based on actual treatment, and to
the extent those modifications filter down to the payments that
plans make to providers, the risk adjuster may blunt the impulse to
stint on service. But it simultaneously, and apparently inevitably,
varies from the central bargain of managed care, in which payers
"privatize" control over the delivery of care in order to gain ad-
ministrative efficiency and cost control.152 Prospective risk ad-
justment seems true to the bargain, as it continues to pay a flat,
once-and-for-all premium for all necessary care, leaving the judg-
ments, and the financial ramifications of those judgments, for the
plans. For better or worse, retrospective adjusters are a step away
from the bargain, as payers and plans become jointly responsible
for the ramifications of plans' treatment decisions.
In order to stay true to the bargain between payers and MCOs,
then, and to better serve the dominant motive behind the move-
ment toward risk adjustment (accurate pricing for the benefit of
payers), 153 payers will likely select prospective adjusters. Risk ad-
justment, then, is unlikely to address plans' incentives to stint in
any dramatic way. While more accurately set premiums will re-
duce plans' incentive to deny care as a subterfuge for encouraging
an enrollee to switch to another plan, 54 it will not reduce plans'
incentive, or that of their network providers subject to financial
incentives to reduce utilization, to be overly conservative in any
particular treatment setting. For prospective risk adjustment con-
tinues to treat each additional service to a member as a dead loss to
the plan. Risk adjustment, then, is likely to respond to one of the
reasons for concern about the treatment of the chronically ill by
MCOS - the fiscal interests of payers - without significantly re-
sponding to the concerns for the appropriateness of the treatment
151 See supra text accompanying notes 15-32 (discussing the managed care role
and organizations' relationships with payers).
d 12 Sef Ellis et al., supra note 127, at 124 (noting the substantial administrative
difficultifs inherent in a retrospective system).
153 See Newhouse et al., supra note 7, at 34-35 (discussing prospective adjusters
in Medicare and managed care).
154 See Newhouse, supra note 62, at 138 (noting that plans could, in the absence
of adequate risk adjusters, -feign a certain amount of ignorance or simply be rude to
potentially high-cost patients").
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of the chronically ill, either for their own sake or as surrogates for
the well population.
B. Structural Regulation of MCOs
The bargain with managed care notwithstanding, federal and
state governments are increasingly imposing regulatory restrictions
on the behavior of MCOs.155 These interventions into the manage-
ment of MCOs have come about as a reaction to a broad range of
"horror stories" of injuries or mistreatment allegedly suffered by
consumers subject to managed health care. 56 The federal move-
ment to regulate the behavior of managed care plans is apparent in
the Balanced Budget Act of 1997, which, while extending the use
of managed care for federal health programs, provided sets of ex-
plicit beneficiary protections for both Medicare 57 and Medicaid. 58
In addition, both the House of Representatives 59 and the Senate' 6°
of the 1 0 5 1h Congress passed bills (albeit, different bills) proposing
to codify a "patient bill of rights" for some privately insured per-
sons. And many states, not waiting for federal action, have adopted
their own patient protection statutes aimed at various activities of
MCOs.1
6
'
155 See Waxman & Dallek, supra note 97, at 2 (discussing state legislative at-
tempts to provide solutions to the problems of managed care consumers); see also
Moran, supra note 32, at 8-9 (looking into governmental regulations that use a man-
aged care approach); Hoffmann, supra note 18, at 319-20 (discussing the Federal
Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act (EMTALA) and noting that 12
states have enacted legislation to eliminate the obstacles that MCOs have placed in
the way of patients in need of emergency care); Managed Care Regulations: States
Respond to Complaints With Moves to Protect Consumers, 23 ST. INITIATIVES IN
HEALTH CARE REFORM 1, 1-3 (1997).
15 See Moran, supra note 32, at 8-9 (looking into the impulse toward govern-
mental regulations for managed care); see also Jacobi, supra note at 27, at 711-17
(describing several accounts of patients' mistreatment under managed health care).
'57 See 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-22 (1998) (establishing benefits and beneficiary pro-
tections under the Medicare+Choice program).
"' See 42 U.S.C. § 1396u-2(b) (1998) (listing beneficiary protections such as
"assuring coverage to emergency services," "protection of enrollee-provider commu-
nications," "grievance procedures," and "protecting enrollees against liability for
payment").
59 See Patient Protection Act of 1998. H.R. 4250, 105th Cong. (1998) (propos-
ing a patient bill of rights which would "provide new patient protections under group
health plans").
'60 See S. 2330, 105th Cong., 2d Sess. (1998) (proposing "to improve the access
and choice of patients to quality affordable health care").
161 See Waxman & Dallek, supra note 97, at 3-4 (discussing examples of con-
sumer protection statutes that have been enacted to ensure adequate health coverage).
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The proposed and enacted laws are aimed at a wide variety of
variety of MCO activities. Some attempt, at least partially, to take
away from MCOs the power to determine which treatments, and
for what duration, are medically necessary. Some, for example,
prescribe minimum hospital lengths of stay for patients undergoing
childbirth or a mastectomy.1 62 Others require MCOs to cover care
(or at least stabilization) in an emergency department when a "rea-
sonably prudent person" would regard the enrollee's condition to
be such as to require emergency care.163 Previously, plans had been
the masters of determinations of a condition's emergency status, as
they were of virtually all medical necessity decisions.'6
Others set mandates and requirements interfering with the
ability of MCOs to control the access of enrollees to specialists.
Some, for example, require that women be afforded the option of
designating an obstetrician/gynecologist rather than an internist or
generalist, as their primary doctor. 5 Others require that plans
162 See 29 U.S.C. § 1185(a)(1)(A) (1998) (requiring ERISA plans to cover 48-
hour hospital stay following normal vaginal delivery and 96-hour stays following
cesarean delivery); TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 21.52G(3)(a)(1) (West 1998)
(requring health insurers to cover 48-hour hospital stays for mastectomies); TEx.
REv. STAT. ANN. art. 21.54F(4)(a)(1)-(2) (West 1998) (establishing the 48/96 hour
rule for post-childbirth hospital stays); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-3-168 (1997) (requires
that the length of hospital stay following mastectomy be based on the "unique char-
acteristics of each patient," and be determined by the treating physician); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 26:2J-4.15(a) (West 1998) (providing that, following modified radical mas-
tectomy, an HMO must provide a 72-hour hospital stay, and a 48-hour stay following
simple mastectomy); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1367.62(a)(1) (West 1998)
(establishing a 48/96 hour rule for post-childbirth hospital stays); 215 ILL. COMP.
STAT. 5/356s (West 1998) (establishing a 48/96 hour rule for post-childbirth hospital
stays).
163 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395w-22(d)(3) (West Supp. 1998) (stating that
Medicare+Choice plans must cover emergency evaluation and stabilization outside
plan under a "prudent layperson" standard); 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396u-2(b)(2) (stating that
Medicaid managed care plans must cover emergency evaluation and stabilization
outside plan under "prudent layperson" standard); 1998 Cal. Legis. Serv. 1015 (West)
amending CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1371.4 (West Supp. 1998) (stating that a
health plan must cover emergency stabilization outside plan under "reasonable en-
rollee" standard); N.Y. INs. LAw § 4303(a)(2) (McKinney Supp. 1998) (hospital
service corporations and health service corporations must cover emergency treatment
under "prudent layperson" standard); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-3-190(a) (Supp. 1997)
(health insurer must cover emergency screening and stabilization outside of plan
under "'prudent layperson" standard).
164 See Hoffmann, supra note 18, at 327-29 (discussing preauthorization re-
quirements for emergency and non-emergency care MCOs commonly used to proce-
durally limit access to care by enrollees).
165 See S. 2330, 105th Cong., 2d Sess. § 723 (1998) (proposing that covered
plans be required to permit direct access to OB/GYN services); H.R. 4250, 105th
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permit some chronically ill members to gain direct access to cer-
tain specialty physicians, circumventing generally applicable plan
rules requiring a referral by a primary care doctor.' Previously,
plans subjected primary care physicians to protocols and financial
incentives to control the referral of patients to specialty physicians
as a central aspect of their cost containment efforts. 167
Yet another set of proposed and enacted legislation mandates
procedures for enrollees' disputes with their MCOs. Some, for ex-
ample, require that plans permit external review of utilization and
medical necessity disputes left unresolved by internal plan dispute
resolution procedures. Some of these external review procedures
are not binding on the plans, and are intended to serve an "advi-
sory" function - although the failure of the plan to heed the advice
may be reportable to a regulatory agency or the public.16' Other
procedures are binding on the plan, and require the plan to provide
services to the enrollee consistent with any decision rendered by
the external reviewing entity. 69 Previously, plans had carefully
Cong. (1998) (planning to amend the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of
1974 by adding section 713 allowing a patient access to unrestricted medical advice,
emergency medical care, obstetric and gynecological care, and pediatric care); 1998
1Il. Legis. Serv. 90-741 (West) amending 215 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/356r (West Supp.
1998) (requiring health plans to permit women to designate OB/GYNs as their pri-
mary care physicians); TEx. INS. CODE § 21.53D(4) (West Supp. 1998) (health plans
required to permit direct access to OB/GYN services); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
§ 1367.69(a) (West Supp. 1998) (requiring plans to include OB/GYNs as primary
carep hysicians).1c See T. INS. CODE ANN. § 20A.09(a)(3)(D) (West Supp. 1998) (requiring
HMOs to permit chronically ill member to apply to the plan to designate specialty
physician as primary care physician).167 See Kongstvedt, supra note 24, at 121-22 (describing how excess funds in
capitation pools are used to reward primary care physicians who make few patient
referrals).
'6' See S. 2330, 105th Cong., 2d Sess., § 121(a) (1998) (proposing to amend §
503 of ERISA to require that plan permit non-binding external review of denial of
services); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:2S-12 (West Supp. 1998) (creating a non-binding
appeal process for denial of services by managed care plans).
369 See 42 U.S.C.S. § 1395w-22(g) (Lexis Supp. 1998) (providing for binding
external appeals from coverage decisions of Medicare+Choice plans); see also ARiz.
REV. STAT. ANN. §20-2537 (West Supp. 1997) (providing that a member may initiate
a binding external independent review if a plan's agent denies the member's request
for a covered service claim at both the informal and formal appeal levels); Mo. ANN.
STAT. § 376.1387 (West Supp. 1998) (requiring MCO directors to resolve grievances
by enrollees over adverse determinations of covered services by any means not spe-
cifically prohibited by law, including through utilization of services of independent
review organizations); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1370.4 (West Supp. 1998)
(providing the independent review process to examine the plan's coverage decisions
regarding experimental or investigational therapies for enrollees).
1999]
HEALTH MATRIX
controlled the grievance and dispute resolution processes, provid-
ing procedures within the plan, subject to decisions by plan em-
ployees, in order to maintain as much control over the dispute
resolution process as possible.17
0
These regulatory measures are quite new, and time will tell
how well they serve their intended ends. For present purposes, two
questions should be asked: first, whether these regulatory measures
are consistent with the bargain struck between payers (including
government payers) and plans, and, second, whether these regula-
tory measures (or others like them) will likely succeed in moder-
ating plans' inclination to exclude or stint.
The first question is essentially a political one. To the extent
the bargain between payers and plans is literally that - a contract
setting out terms, then, of course the contract is binding for its
term. But the bargain at issue here is metaphorical, more akin to
Rouseau's social compact than a purchase and sale agreement.
Under those circumstances, whether and to what extent regulations
should shape MCO behavior is properly in the hands of govern-
ment, as political representative of broader society - one of the
parties to the bargain. The bargain has always been subject to
regulatory oversight,171 although central to the bargain has been the
movement of health care network formation, maintenance, and
compensation away from government (and private payer) control,
and delegating the task to entrepreneurial MCOs.'72 Although it is
undeniable that injecting additional regulatory control over MCOs
changes the bargain, and may reduce society's benefit there-
from,17 3 it is a proper political question to ask whether broader so-
170 See Peter R. Kongstvedt, Member Services and Consumer Affairs, in Es.
SENTIALS OF MANAGED HEALTH CARE, supra note 1, at 382-86 (discussing types of
consumer complaints and grievances, while presenting the formal procedures enacted
by health care plans to resolve them). There is, of course, a continuing dispute over
the proper role of litigation in resolving disputes between plans and members. See
Furrow, supra note 27, at 485-509 (analyzing theories of liability potentially avail-
able to injured patients for use against managed care organizations). That discussion
is beyond the scope of this Article.
"
1
' See Alain C. Enthoven & Sara J. Singer, Markets and Collective Action in
Regulating Managed Care, HEALTH AFF., Nov.-Dec. 1997, at 26, 26 (discussing the
necessary role of government regulation, along with market forces, in the develop-
ment of an efficient and equitable health care system).
172 See generally id. (discussing the fact that, although market forces control
managed care costs, collective regulation is, to some extent, necessary for controlling
against market failure).
173 See Moran, supra note 32, at 16-17 (examining the potential effect that fed-
eral regulation of managed care has on society).
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ciety prefers more costly, more heavily regulated managed care to
the status quo. 174 And the recent "backlash" against managed care
has been argued to constitute a public consensus for trimming the
autonomy of MCOs in some way. Recent surveys have disclosed
that approximately seventy-five percent of Americans support in-
creased government regulation of managed care, although the
number drops to fifty-two percent when the question is framed to
acknowledge the likelihood that such regulation would raise
costs. 175 These numbers are close enough to question the presence
of a broad mandate for change. Moving from the general question
to the specific, however, and considering regulatory measures one-
by-one on their merits is both consistent with the bargain and the
proper domain of legislatures.
The second question - whether the array of regulatory meas-
ures will curb excluding or stinting behavior - is harder to resolve.
Initially, it should be noted that the vast majority of these meas-
ures (unlike risk adjustment measures discussed above) attempt to
regulate stinting, not excluding behavior. There certainly are
regulatory measures aimed at excluding - requirements that plans
offer open enrollment and guarantee the issue of coverage for any
qualified applicant are the clearest of these. 176 But most managed
care regulations, and all of those described above, are aimed at
plan behavior that would deny or limit care to an enrollee during
the period of enrollment. While each of the regulations imposed on
managed care will likely be evaluated in practice in years to come,
there is reason to doubt the efficacy of these forms of regulation,
which seek to divest plans of decisional authority in very explicit
but narrow circumstances, often in reaction to the public's percep-
tion of specific abuses by MCOs. 77
The reason for skepticism about the ultimate value of these
structural regulations of MCOs is the very nature of MCOs. The
nature of managed care plans is to change their structure and busi-
174 See Alain C. Enthoven & Sara J. Singer, The Managed Care Backlash and
The Task Force In California, HEALTH AFF., July-Aug. 1998, at 95, 100 (suggesting
that "Americans must reconcile their demand for lower cost with their demand for
unlimited care").
175 See Robert J. Blendon et al., Understanding the Managed Care Backlash,
HEALTH AFF., July-Aug. 1999, at 80, 83 (exploring cost dependent analysis of in-
creased government intervention in MCOs) (West Supp. 1998).
'76 See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395w-21(g) (West Supp. 1998) (imposing guaranteed
issue and renewal requirements for plans participating in Medicare+Choice).
177 See Moran, supra note 32, at 8-9 (decrying "body part du jour" legislation
that is allegedly the result of cynical political reaction to anecdotal reports of abuses).
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ness practices rapidly and continuously, 178 and regulators are likely
to be always a step behind the latest business practice in this dy-
namic area.179 In addition, piecemeal regulatory legislation adopted
to respond to the latest horror story too often represents a facile
response, and one not representing a thoughtful balancing of the
costs of such interference with managed care. But the pace of
change aside, the methods by which MCOs contain costs are sim-
ply too complex and subtle to be easily addressed by rigid regula-
tions. In the context of managed care for one set of chronic condi-
tions, mental health and substance abuse (MH/SA), the problem
with regulation has been described as follows:
The significance of the shift to managed care for MH/SA
is that insurance contracts have become much more com-
plicated and at the same time more remote from regulatory
control. Managed care typically covers "medically neces-
sary" care. Medical necessity and therefore de facto cover-
age for treatment of MH/SA conditions depends on a com-
plex set of interrelationships involving the features of the
benefit package, the structure of the provider network or-
ganized by the managed care organization, the financial
incentives facing providers, and the administrative mecha-
nisms put in place by the managed care organization to
control utilization and quality of care.'8°
In other areas of treatment as well, "[t]he denial of necessary care
is carried out through mechanisms that are often subtle and vary
depending on the structure of the managed care plan."'' The sub-
178 See Wagner, supra note 1, at 37 ("As a result of... recent changes, the de-
scriptions of different types of managed care systems that follow provide only a
guideline for determining the form of managed care organization that is observed. In
many cases (or in most cases in some markets), the managed health care organization
will be a hybrid of several specific types").
179 See Lynn Etheredge, Pronarket Regulation: An SEC-FASB Model, HEALTH
AFF., Nov.-Dec. 1997, at 22 (noting that governmental agencies' "bureaucratic deci-
sion-making processes, requiring two to three years for major regulations, are slow
compared with today's pace of market change"). In addition, piecemeal regulatory
legislation adopted to respond to the latest horror story too often represents a facile
response, and one not representing a thoughtful balancing of the costs of such inter-
ference with managed care. See Furrow, supra note 19, at 394-95 (explaining that
legislation is often flawed by a rush to protect what is "politically charged," and not
that which is a serious problem).180 Frank et al., supra note 58, at 113.
181 Sharon L. Davies & Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, Managed Care: Placebo or
Wonder Drug for Health Care Fraud and Abuse?, 31 GA. L. REv. 373, 386 (1997)
[Vol. 9:79
THE CHRONICALLY ILL IN MANAGED CARE
tle mechanisms include the financial pressures on providers im-
posed by capitation and withhold/bonus compensation plans, "phy-
sician profiling" or economic credentialing, by which providers'
admission and retention in a network is dependent on adherence to
a plan's philosophy of practice, and the use of practice guidelines
to encourage physicians to practice more conservatively. 
182
In short, the practices most responsible for stinting behavior
in MCOs are constantly evolving with marketplace innovations,
and are either carried out through subtle, difficult-to-police en-
forcement methods, or are the natural result of the financial com-
pensation methods that are at the heart of the managed care form.
At some level, regulating MCOs to control stinting is a battle
against human nature. MCOs prosper, after all, from aligning pro-
viders' economic incentives with the cost containment goals of the
plan. Egregious misbehavior is and always will be the proper and
sensible subject of regulatory control. But it may be unreasonable
to expect structural regulation of managed care to provide suitable
comprehensive protection of the medically needy from care denials
in a system driven by incentives to conserve cost.
C. Information Distribution and Private Accreditation
Risk adjustment is likely to do little to address problems with
stinting, although it may eventually be an effective means to ad-
dress excluding. And structural regulation, while effective in pre-
venting the most extreme abuses, is unlikely to serve as proof
against stinting. Can the recent move toward "market-based regu-
lation" in the form of quality analysis and broad distribution of
evaluative information be expected to protect the chronically ill
from stinting behavior? Perhaps it can in the future, but not in the
near term. The ability meaningfully to measure the performance of
MCOs has not yet been realized, although progress is being made,
and the lack of a well-functioning assessment system is not attrib-
utable to "lack of effort or brains, but the fact that performance
measurement is just plain difficult."1 83
(discussing methods that managed care providers use to discourage patients from
utilizing the plan's medical services).
182 See Edward B. Hirshfeld & Gail H. Thomason, Medical Necessity Determi-
nations: The Need for a New Legal Structure, 6 HEALTH MATRIX 3, 27-31 (1996)
(evaluating indirect pressures which influence physicians to keep care costs low, such
as ca~itations, fee withhold arrangements, and physician profiling).
Eddy, supra note 101, at 8.
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Efforts to gather, analyze, and publish qualitative information
about MCOs has advanced in recent years, largely through the ef-
forts of the National Committee on Quality Assurance (NCQA)'14
and its use of the Health Plan Employer Data and Information Set
(HEDIS). 185 Through NCQA and other organizations,186 payers and
consumers have access to information measuring plan perform-
ance, structure, and process in a variety of areas. ' In theory, pay-
ers and consumers may use data-gathering and analytic activity as
a partial correction of managed care market failures.188 Specifi-
cally, access to plan data and analyses thereof can provide payers
and consumers with information to enable them to assess compet-
ing plans, and to enforce quality, access, and cost standards
through market power - by choosing to do business with plans that
meet their needs and requirements. 19
184 The National Committee on Quality Assurance (NCQA) "is a not-for-profit
organization dedicated to assessing and reporting on the quality of managed care
plans. [Its] mission is to provide information that enables purchasers and consumers
of managed health care to distinguish among plans based on quality, thereby allowing
them to make more informed health care purchasing decisions." National Committee
for Quality Assurance: An Overview, <http'//www.ncqa.orgtoverview3.htm> (visited
Nov. 3, 1998). See also Furrow, supra note 19, at 400 (explaining the function of the
NCQA).
NCQA is governed by a 23-member board of directors. The members appear
to have the following affiliations: business and industry (6), provider (including, but
not limited to, health plan) (11), labor union (2), consumer (3), and NCQA officer
(1). Board of Directors <http'J/www.ncqa.org/board.htm> (last modified Apr. 6,
1998)
185 The Health Plan Employer Data and Information Set (HEDIS) is a data base
maintained by NCQA, and comprises a "set of standardized performance measures
designed to ensure that purchasers and consumers have the information they need to
compare reliably the performance of managed health care plans." HEDISIReport
Cards <http.//www.ncqa.org/hedis/30exsum.htm> (visited Nov. 3, 1998).
186 See Eddy, supra note 101, at 20 (stating that various organizations, such as
NCQA, have described criteria used in assessing performance measures).
187 The latest iteration of HEDIS (HEDIS 3.0), for example, measures plan per-
formance, structure, and process in eight areas: effectiveness of care, ac-
cess/availability of care, member satisfaction, plan stability, use of services by mem-
bers, costs, patient education, and plan organization. HEDIS 3.0 Reporting and
Testing Set Measures, <http://www.ncqa.org/news/hedismeas.htm> (visited Nov. 3,
1998). See also Kuhlthau et al., supra note 12, at 44.48 (discussing the strengths and
weaknesses of HEDIS 3.0).
188 See Moran, supra note 32, at 11-15 (examining the theory of a managed care
market and showing the most commonly cited defects: information asymmetries,
health insurance, supplier-induced demand, and concerns about the uninsured).
189 See Furrow, supra note 19, at 404-05 (discussing both the competitive and
consumer benefits that the public release of hospital outcome and success rate infor-
mation would provide).
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The two closely related benefits consumers and payers hope
to gain from the data-gathering and analytic efforts are access to
data on performance, structure and process, and guidance from the
informed judgments, in the form of ratings or accreditation, from
detached observers and experts. The second is a shorthand version
of the first. Should payers and consumers be disinclined or unable
to examine for themselves the array of data reports appropriate to
their assessment of plans according to their desires and needs, they
could use the ratings or accreditation process as a proxy for indi-
vidualized assessment. The ratings and accreditation process em-
ploys data generated from performance (including patient satisfac-
tion), structure and process measures, applies an evaluative judg-
ment of the implications of the data, and reports a simple (or sim-
pler) result. 19° In other words, consumers and payers disinclined to
examine and evaluate data themselves can accept the judgment of
the NCQA, which reports on "full," "one-year," "provisional," or
"denied" status of plans on accreditation, and accept that judgment
as a rough indicator of the quality of a plan.1
91
The potentials and shortcomings of the assessment systems
have been described elsewhere, and will not be rehearsed here.
92
An incomplete list of the difficulties faced by the current systems
includes: the conceptual difficulty of identifying measurable fac-
tors indicative of quality health care; information systems prob-
lems in gathering an accurate, suitably large sample of data for
each relevant factor; the presence of competing and inconsistent
measurement tools; and the massive problem of digesting large
amounts of data, and translating that data into a form comprehen-
190 See id. at 400-07 (describing the NCQA accreditation process).
191 Id. at 401 (discussing the percentage of plans that receive full accreditation,
one-year approval, provisional accreditation, or a denial).
'9
2 See, e.g., Eddy, supra note 101 (discussing the lack of sufficient indicators
available to measure performance of health plans, and offering possible solutions);
Furrow, supra note 19 (discussing the function of private accreditation in the man-
aged care industry); Jacobi, supra note 27 (analyzing the scope and shortcomings of
health care assessment techniques); Wendy K. Mariner, Outcomes Assessment in
Health Care Reform: Promise and Limitations, 20 AM. J. L. & MED. 37, 37 (1994)
(defining outcomes assessment and outlining "the possible uses of outcomes assess-
ment in creating and operating a reformed health care system, and key legal implica-
tions"); Maxwell J. Mehlman, Assuring the Quality of Medical Care: The Impact of
Outcome Measurement and Practice Standards, 18 L. MED. & HEALTH CARE 368
(1990) (discussing concerns that the quality assurance systems are ineffective, unfair,
and costly). See also AVEDIS DONABEDIAN, THE DEFINITION OF QUALITY AND
APPROACHES TO ITS ASSESSMENT (1980) (exploring the definition of quality and some
basic approaches to its assessment).
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sible to payers and consumers. 193 Two overriding non-technical
problems also loom. First, it is unclear who will actually use the
information produced, and in what fashion. 94 Second, the infor-
mation generated will not be useful if the recipients, and particu-
larly consumers, are not permitted the use the information to exert
market pressure, by exercising choice in the selection of a plan.
95
Were the above problems resolved, consumers and payers
would be able to assess for themselves plans' performance in an
array of areas relevant to their choice of a plan. Should informa-
tion and analysis be available in a form accurately reflecting rele-
vant plan performance, in a form accessible to payers and consum-
ers, and should payers and consumers be empowered to act on the
information received, these devices would serve as a very effective
corrective to managed care market failures. Specifically, plans that
stinted on care would be revealed, and to the extent that their
stinting behavior was regarded as unacceptable, the plans would
suffer loss of market share unless and until they corrected their
behavior.
As conditional as this sounds, the likelihood that a data-based
information and accreditation procedure useful to payers' and con-
sumers' judgments on plan quality will be met in the foreseeable
future seems akin to the likelihood of a harmonic convergence.
First, a chronically ill person, by virtue of his health status, is often
nearly overwhelmed by the many tasks and complications that fall
to him in negotiating social service systems, diet and exercise re-
quirements, health systems, in addition to abnormally high levels
of pain and discomfort. 96 Second, the low frequency of many
chronic illnesses make them difficult subjects of measurement
across plans, and therefore unlikely to appear in consensus panels'
19- See Eddy, supra note 101, at 11-17 (listing difficulties faced by health plan
assessment systems).
194 See Robert S. Galvin, Are Performance Measures Relevant?, HEALTH AFF.,
July-Aug. 1998, at 29, 30 (explaining the need for performance measures in managed
care health systems that more accurately reflect what physicians and patients want);
see also Judith H. Hibbard et al., Choosing a Health Plan: Do Large Employers Use
the Data?, HEALTH AFF., Nov.-Dec. 1997, at 172, 178-79 (discussing barriers to the
efficient use of clinical quality information by purchasers).
195 See Furrow, supra note 19, at 390 (explaining that the lack of information
available regarding access to care and quality of care precludes consumers from
making informed decisions about health care).
196 See Jennings et al., supra note 7, at 6 (detailing common problems of people
suffering from chronic illnesses).
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determinations of factors for measurement. 97 Third, HEDIS, the
dominant tool for measuring plan performance, fails to measure
adequately plan performance for chronic care. In its current itera-
tion, it
[L]acks a method to define the population of children with
chronic conditions beyond disability enrollment based on
SSI criteria (which is collected only for the Medicaid
population). In addition, HEDIS lacks specific structure,
process, and outcomes measures for this population.'9"
Fourth, people with chronic conditions, and certainly those with
particular chronic conditions, will never be able to rely on the ac-
creditation process as will the well population. Those with child-
hood diabetes, for example, will be in a tiny minority, 199 and will
see their more specific chronic care indicators washed out in a
global assessment process. And fifth, the chronically ill may lack
market power to use the information meaningfully. That is, they
may be either too small a group, with idiosyncratic needs, for a
plan to court,200 or, unless much-improved risk adjustment meth-
ods truly make them as attractive a group of enrollees as the well
population, plans may be willing to lose their patronage.
20 1
In sum, the circle will be difficult to square. Public or private
regulation to eliminate or minimize excluding and stinting behav-
ior directed by MCOs at the chronically ill show some promise to
help, but are unlikely to succeed in the foreseeable future. Risk
adjustment, at best, is likely to control excluding behavior, to the
benefit of payers as much as consumers. Structural regulation is
197 See Eddy, supra note 101, at 12 (pointing out that the low frequency of cer-
tain diseases is a natural problem which makes the use of population-based health
plan assessment measures very difficult); see also Kuhlthau et al., supra note 12, at
43 (distinguishing health care of children with chronic conditions from that of adults,
and the impact low-occurrence diseases have on monitoring such conditions).
198 Kuhlthau et al., supra note 12, at 48. See also Elizabeth A. McGlynn, Choos-
ing Chronic Disease Measures for HEDIS" Conceptual Framework and Review of
Seven Clinical Areas, in MANAGED CARE AND CHRONIC ILLNESS: CHALLENGES AND
OPPORTUNITIES, supra note 7, at 18 (discussing analysis produced for NCQA's
steering committee considering adding chronic conditions to HEDIS).
199 See Kuhlthau et al., supra note 12, at 43 (explaining how children with dia-
betes are only a small percentage of those children with chronic illnesses, and how
this impacts on measurements of care).
200 See id. (describing how some chronic diseases, such as diabetes, only affect a
very small number of children).
0 See supra text accompanying notes 112-28 (discussing risk selection and
adjustment).
1999)
HEALTH MATRIX
bound to be ineffective, as the very nature of managed care creates
subtle incentives and works on innumerable and hidden decision
points not readily addressed by rigid rules. And information distri-
bution and accreditation processes are still in their infancy, and
will, even when mature, be more likely to protect the well than the
chronically ill. In light of these conclusions, the following section
sets out some preliminary thoughts as to the proper social response
to the inadequacy of the bargain as it applies to the chronically ill.
IV. MOVING BEYOND MANAGED CARE FOR THE
CHRONICALLY ILL
If, notwithstanding the measures described above, the circle
cannot be squared, and the managed care bargain cannot be tink-
ered with to accommodate the interests of the chronically ill to
avoid excluding and stinting behavior by MCOs, what can be
done? One choice that is clearly not a possibility is to revert "to
the status quo ante of, say, 1975.' 2 The world of health care and
health care finance has simply moved on; legislation simply at-
tacking managed care probably "misses the evolution of health
care that managed care represents. The point of many of these
changes is to produce a sophisticated integrated team approach to
care rather than focusing on the model of the virtuous and solitary
physician." 20 3 It is in the interest of the chronically ill, after all, to
move to a more integrated system of health care delivery, and
away from the episodic, fragmented system of the "good old
days.' 2°
This section will examine two methods by which some com-
mentators have proposed more fundamental adjustments to the
managed care bargain than those discussed above. The two meth-
ods share a common interest in maintaining in managed care that
which is good for the chronically ill while modifying that which
threatens them. Managed care is the combination of health finance
202 See Moran, supra note 32, at 20 (showing problems with the current health
care system, prospects for workable federal regulation, as well as concerns with the
proposed federal regulatory solution).
203 Furrow, supra note 19, at 395.
204 See Christianson et al., supra note 7, at 18 (discussing the history of the
treatment process included in caring for the chronically ill); see also Sandy & Gib-
son, supra note 7, at 12 (stating that managed care systems have the potential to
overcome the fragmented effects of a poorly organized fee-for-service sector).
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and health care delivery.205 Both of the following models propose
to preserve the ability of managed care to coordinate and organize
a broad array of care. Both propose changes in the financing aspect
of managed care. The first model proposes a centralization of the
financing aspect of managed care, in which the Health Care Fi-
nancing Administration (HCFA) acts as a meta-MCO. The second
proposes that, for the chronically ill, reimbursement not be based
solely on a fixed capitation or global premium, but rather on a mix
of a capitation amount and additional per-service payments to re-
flect actual utilization. The first appears to vary too much from the
beneficial aspects of the managed care bargain be engrafted onto
it, and could not be undertaken without a substantial and conscious
political change of heart, while the second appears to be a sensible
accommodation of the tension in managed care treatment for the
chronically ill, if one difficult to put into practice.
A. Centralization of Financial Function: HCFA as an MCO
In an article drafted before the Balanced Budget Act of 1997
was enacted, Peter D. Fox bemoaned the fact that Medicare would
remain a "fee-for-service system for the foreseeable future."2°6 He,
like many other analysts, believes that "[m]anaged care offers the
potential for reducing utilization," and that, by employing man-
aged care, Medicare could avoid the threatened evil of benefit or
reimbursement reductions. 2 7 Forecasting no appreciable shift in
Medicare to managed care, he made an interesting proposal. With-
out quite saying so explicitly, he suggested that, if Mohammed
would not go to the mountain, the mountain should come to Mo-
hammed: Medicare should become a meta-MCO. He suggested
that Medicare cease acting as merely a financing entity, and begin
acting as a health program208 - integrating, as do MCOs, the fi-
nancing and care delivery functions.
I approach the issues from a slightly different direction than
does Fox. I believe, for instance, that with the creation of a man-
aged care infrastructure in Medicare by the addition of Medi-
205 See Eaton, supra note 1, at 368 (discussing how managed care's cost-cutting
focus requires an adaptation of legal policies that were created under the fee-for-
service system).
206 Peter D. Fox, Applying Managed Care Techniques In Traditional Medicare,
HEA,.TH Apr., Sept.-Oct. 1997, at 44, 45.
207 Id. at 45.
2o5 See id. at 51 (stating that this would require a shift in timing regarding how
Medicare functions).
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care+Choice,2 °9 future Congresses will be tempted to create sub-
stantial financial incentives to move more Medicare beneficiaries
into managed care. In addition, my primary concern in the Article
is not conserving payers' resources (although this is a genuinely
important goal), but ensuring appropriate care for the chronically
ill. Fox's modest proposal nevertheless offers an intriguing model
for escaping the pressures managed care places on the chronically
ill.
Fox begins by explaining why it is difficult for HCFA to
mimic the nimble, ever-changing management style that charac-
terizes MCOs. He points out that Medicare's very size (it insures
one-third or more of the patients seen by many providers) 20 and its
political accountability limit its ability to act decisively in provider
network formation, maintenance, and payment. 21 As a govern-
mental agency, its actions give rise to due process rights, and its
contracting, personnel and rulemaking tasks must comply with
various "sunshine act" requirements.212 Perhaps most tellingly,
Medicare must make rules through notice and comment rulemak-
ing, requiring it to have a lead time measured not in days but in
years.213
While Fox accurately captures the institutional limitations of
HCFA, he may overstate the institutional merits of MCOs. Since
Fox's analysis, many MCOs have fallen upon hard times.21 4 In re-
cent years, escalating competitive pressures have led MCOs to
compete on the basis of price,215 and their attempts to expand mar-
ket share seem to have overwhelmed their broader sense of fiscal
209 See 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1395w-21 to -28 (West Supp. 1997) (creating and defin-
ing the Medicare+Choice program).
210 Fox, supra note 206, at 46 (noting, additionally, that the percentage may be
greater than 50% in some specialists' practices).
211 Id. (stating that, due to Medicare's size, the tendency of the government is to
focus its attention on extreme outliers in the program, thus reducing its ability to
influence practice norms).
212 See id. (explaining that many decisions made by private plans are made pri-
vately and are judgmental, contrasting justified public decisions by government
agencies).
213 See id. (stating that "[g]ovemment agencies are often slow in making deci-
sions because of their size and organization").
214 See Michele Bitoun Blecher, Burned on the Street, Hosp. & HEA1H
NETWORKS, Mar. 5, 1998, at 23 (reporting the financial woes of Oxford Health Plans
and other MCOs due to the decline of their stock on Wall Street).
215 See Hoffmann, supra note 18, at 324-29 (explaining the means managed care
plans use to lower costs so that they can compete on the basis of price).
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prudence.21 6 The moves of the largely for-profit, entrepreneurial
managed care business these days often seems driven as much by
the judgments of investment bankers and venture capitalists as by
health systems administrators.2 7 And even old, large, stable not-
for-profit MCOs have experienced grave financial setbacks, and
are facing the prospect of either seeking large premium increases,
or dramatically cutting costs. 218 Hard times may force a revision of
the almost automatic preference for private business over the re-
viled government bureaucrat.
After acknowledging the barriers to governmental action, Fox
proposes that HCFA take steps to effect programmatic changes in
Medicare. With respect to physicians and other professionals, he
proposes that HCFA act as a PPO, creating select panels based on
practice style and economic examination of utilization - in other
words, HCFA should engage in economic credentialing.1 9 In ad-
dition, HCFA should institute utilization controls, such as precerti-
fication and concurrent review, and should use primary care physi-
cians as gatekeepers. 220 And it should fund separately population-
based health education and case management for the chronically ill
and frail elderly population 2 t These last measures would permit
access to services, such as social services and housing support, that
216 See Blecher, supra note 214 (discussing the challenges that MCOs have faced
in recent years, and their responses to competitive pressures).
217 See id.; see also Jan Greene, Starting Up the Upstarts, Hosp. & HEALTH
NETWORKs, Dec. 20, 1997, at 16, 18 (discussing how venture capitalists and other
investors are becoming interested in managed care, and how these investors are af-
fecting the development of managed care companies).
21' See Richard Haugh, Kaiser's Squeeze Play, HosP. & HEALTH NETWORKS,
May 5, 1998, at 37-38 (discussing possible actions by Kaiser Permanente to reach
economic stability after a multi-million dollar loss in 1997).
219 See Fox, supra note 25, at 48-49 (explaining how improving provider profil-
ing, conducting utilization studies, and developing PPO arrangements can improve
Medicare, and suggesting that "HCFA could use practice profiles to identify efficient
physicians and negotiate agreements with those willing to accept rates below those of
Medicare or those who volunteer to cooperate with selected utilization management
requirements"). See supra text accompanying notes 27-28 (discussing economic cre-
dentialing).
2m See Fox, supra note 25, at 50 (describing how prior authorization of selected
high-cost services can achieve savings, and discussing how a gate-keeping method
would offer the advantages of achievement of savings through practices such as case
management fee compensation to physicians for social service contacts).
221 See id. at 52-53 (discussing the need for Medicare to fund local agencies to
conduct secondary and tertiary prevention programs for the chronically ill and the
elderly).
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are both beyond the scope of the defined-benefit Medicare pro-
gram, and absolutely essential to the populations Fox identifies.22
What Fox envisions is a one-tier shift from the current "pri-
vatized" vision of Medicare managed care. In current Medicare
managed care, HCFA gives over to commercial MCOs the pro-
vider network formation, maintenance, and compensation tasks,
and the MCOs in turn arrange, through subcapitation and other
downstream financing mechanisms, for the delivery of care as ap-
propriate.223 Fox proposes retaining the provider network forma-
tion, maintenance, and compensation tasks within HCFA, with
HCFA then acting not "as a financing [but as] a health program,"
aggressively and actively managing the entire spectrum of provid-
ers, as well as the care of Medicare enrollees, after the fashion of a
commercial MCO.
The reinvention of HCFA as a meta-MCO would provide an
opportunity to infuse the organizational coherence of managed
care with the patient orientation and sensibility of a public health
agency. It goes without saying that the result could be a disaster -
failed experiments in big government are not difficult to find - but
it need not be. If such a step were to succeed, HCFA would have at
its disposal all of the tools of modern health care finance, includ-
ing capitation, partial capitation, case management, and global fees
to apply as the needs of a class of enrollees suggested. The pro-
vider credentialing process could be financial acuity, leavened by
concern for quality and service; the selection of payment method-
ologies could vary not merely according to market pressure, but
according to public policy concerns.
But this vision is unlikely to be realized in the near term.
First, Congress seems to have chosen the road of "privatization" of
network formation, maintenance, and compensation in the Bal-
anced Budget Act of 1997.224 This experiment in privatizing Medi-
222 See id. at 53 (discussing functions that local community agencies could per-
form to proactively reduce costs, such as conducting home assessments, developing
support groups, and moving volunteer programs). See Christianson et al., supra note
7, at 16-17 (arguing that an essential aspect of managing chronic illness is providing
social services).
223 See supra text accompanying notes 15-32 (describing the "privatization" of
Medicare through managed care); see also Latham, supra note 15, at 402-03 (dis-
cussing general techniques of how managed care plans reimburse their physician
providers).
224 See 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1395w-21 to -28 (creating Medicare+Choice); 42
U.S.C.A. § 1396u-2(a)(1)(A) (granting states authority to condition Medicaid enti-
tlement on managed care enrollment).
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care and Medicaid financing has not yet run its course, and it is
unlikely that Congress will veer away before testing is complete.
Second, Fox's vision would inevitably sound of "big government,"
although it is not clear on its face that it would make government
any bigger than it already is. As Fox points out, HCFA's attempts
to engage in precisely the same aggressive network maintenance
activities routinely employed in the private sector would likely
result in a firestorm of protest, as some physicians, hospitals, and
other providers would seek recourse in the political arena for their
disappointment at being excluded from HCFA's PPO-style select
network. And solutions to health financing that sound in big
government were not well-received during the 1993-94 exercise in
considering national health system overhaul. 2 6 Therefore, rein-
vention of HCFA seems not to be in the cards.
B. Partial Capitation and Mixed Systems
That piecemeal regulation cannot vouchsafe the safety of the
chronically ill need not signal that managed care should be aban-
doned as a health financing mechanism. Indeed, as Professor Fur-
row suggests, "the evolution of health care that managed care rep-
resents" may now be too firmly entrenched in the culture of health
care delivery to pretend that abandoning it is an option.22 7 Indeed,
the coordination and team-oriented care that is an aspect of many
managed care organizations is potentially of great benefit to the
chronically ill. It is the finance, and not the care delivery aspects
of managed care, that raises concerns for the chronically ill, and
several commentators have suggested that modifying the financial
relations between plans and caregivers, but not the relationships
among caregivers, may be a suitable method of accommodating the
needs of the chronically ill to managed care. The incentives that
might work well with enrollees who use primary care mostly as
preventive care, and acute care only rarely, seem to run aground
with patients who demonstrably require a high-utilization practice
225 See Fox, supra note 25, at 46 (discussing problems likely to be encountered if
Medicare were to adopt a managed care form of organization).
226 See THEDA SKOCPOL, BOOMERANG: CLINTON'S HEALTH SECURrY EFFORT
AND THE TURN AGAINST GOVERNMENT IN U.S. POLITICS 133-72 (1996) (discussing
the backlash against big government which occurred in 1994 as a result of proposed
health security legislation); Steinmo & Watts, supra note 17, at 330 (arguing that the
comprehensive national health care reform was not passed due to the political struc-
ture and "institutional context" being biased against comprehensive reform).
227 Furrow, supra note 19, at 395 (discussing the flaws of state insurance regula-
tion with respect to MCOs).
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style, such as the chronically ill. The remedial concept, then, is to
maintain managed care's financial incentives for the non-
chronically ill, modify or jettison them for the chronically ill, and
maintain for all enrollees the central coordination of care. While
MCOs use a wide array of financial incentives, they uniformly,
and rather indiscriminately, encourage a reduction in services.2
8
Incentives can take the form of capitation, which itself can be
structured to transfer more or less risk to the provider. For exam-
ple, a physician can accept risk only for the services within her
area of practice, or for all physician services, necessitating her
contracting with a range of other physicians to provide needed
care. 229 Alternatively, providers can be paid on a fee-for-service
basis, but also be subject to "withholds" or bonuses. 3 That is,
providers can expect a certain amount of payment for each service,
but that amount (by the end of an accounting period) can vary
dramatically depending on the provider's performance against a
range of standards, including the level of service utilization expe-
rienced by the plan.2
3 1
These payment methods create incentives for providers to
think creatively about the cost-effectiveness of various treatment
options, to bargain more aggressively with suppliers, and econo-
mize on overhead.232 But, as one commentator has observed,
In the short term, a physician confronting a patient does
not have the options of inventing a new form of cost-
effective preventive treatment, negotiating a lower price
for drugs, or firing a nurse. In that setting, given a choice
of several plausible diagnostic or treatment options, the
physician facing direct financial incentives will have some
incentive to choose the least expensive option. 2
3
228 See generally Kongstvedt, supra note 24, at 115-36 (detailing permutations of
capitation and withhold/bonus arrangements).
229 See Henry T. Greely, Direct Financial Incentives in Managed Care: Unan-
swered Questions, 6 HEALTH MATRIX 53, 57-58 (1996) (describing direct financial
incentives used in managed care, specifically discussing the capitated system's effect
on and risk to the physician).
2-0 See id. at 58-59 (describing bonuses and illustrating how withholds operate
with an example based on Stanfored University's triple option plan).
2-31 See id. at 57 (explaining how salaried physicians' incentives may differ from
those of physicians under the capitated system).
232 See id. at 69-70 (describing the means providers can use to lower the cost of
caring for patients).
2_3 Id. at71.
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In the general population, this impulse to economize on a treat-
ment-by-treatment basis is sometimes moderated by knowledge
that such conduct is penny wise and pound foolish: providing the
appropriate treatment in a timely fashion can often forestall the
need for more expensive treatment in the future.234 This is not as
commonly true for the chronically ill, for whom preventive, or
even curative care cannot diminish the need for ongoing care and
services.235 The incentive created in managed care reimbursement
policies, then, present a grave threat to the chronically ill.
But the coordinated care orientation of managed care, by re-
ducing incentives for institutional care and encouraging coopera-
tion and communication among providers, seems well-suited to
chronic care.236 Some with chronic conditions can, with proper
treatment, experience "marked functional improvement, and in
some instances, cure.",237 For a very large number of the chroni-
cally ill, however, extensive care is necessary to improve or main-
tain function. 2  Treatment goals in such circumstances are quite
different than those for acute illness:
For the increasingly large numbers of individuals suf-
fering from chronic but non-terminal illnesses which
cause functional impairment, "curing" is not possible,
but "caring" includes extensive assessment and treat-
ment aimed at maximizing quality of life on functional
terms.
The clinical approach to chronic disease emphasizes func-
tional assessment and functional goals of therapy ....
Helping the patient requires understanding the interactions
of often multiple chronic disorders, psychological dynam-
234 See id. at 73 (explaining how good treatment often saves the capitated physi-
cian money in the long run by using the example of stroke prevention and vaccina-
tions). See also Horwitz & Stein, supra note 13, at 581 (explaining how HMOs could
offer the coordinated care and preventative services needed by chronically ill chil-
dren, presumably lowering health care costs in the future).
2 See Horwitz & Stein, supra note 13, at 581 (discussing some of the specialized
and ongoing services required by chronically ill children).
2-6 See id. (discussing how HMOs can efficiently "provide improved coordinated care
for those with complex conditions").
237 Neff & Anderson, supra note 8, at 1866 (explaining that those illnesses may re-
quire high expenditures initially and some increased level of expenditures throughout
the child's life).
2 See id.
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ics, and social support systems in order to assess areas of
potential intervention and improvement2
39
Essential to the successful treatment of chronic illness is sustained
and flexible management, "a greater breadth of resources and a
larger number of individuals than the treatment for most acute
problems," and coordination with family members and social
service providers .2 40 The main differences between acute care and
chronic care, then, is that the latter requires:
" a focus on relief of symptoms rather than cure;
* the imperative of patient participation in the care process
("patient empowerment");
" active roles for significant others, mostly immediate fam-
ily;
* unclear boundaries among providers and between tradi-
tional medical services and the social services delivery
system; and
" technical quality and patient (as well as family) satisfac-
tion being more interdependent than for acute care.24'
242How, then, can the paradox of managed care be resolved, in
light of the likely partial failure of incremental regulation? Two
strategies are now employed, on very small scales, in which the
provider coordination function of managed care is maintained, but
the nature of the financial relationships between payer and plan or
the plan and its providers is altered. The first is "partial capita-
tion," in which the payer's capitation rate or the plan's subcapita-
tion rate to a provider is only a part of the payment for services.
The basic capitation amount under such a scheme is supplemented
either through a reinsurance plan, where fee-for-service payments
begin after costs have reached a threshold level, or through a
"blending" of capitation and fee-for-service payments from the
239 Cassel, supra note 33, at 408 (discussing the quality of life as a treatment
goal).
240 Christianson et al., supra note 7, at 17 (discussing the essential components of
managing chronic illness).
241 Peter D. Fox & Teresa Fama, Managed Care and Chronic Illness: An Over-
view, in MANAGED CARE AND CHRONIC ILLNESS: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES,
supra note 7, at 6. See generally Ronnie Grower et al., Case Management: Meeting
the Needs of Chronically Ill Patients in an HMO, in MANAGED CARE AND CHRONIC
ILLNESS: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES, supra note 7, at 73-92 (providing exam-
ples of organizational attempts to provide coordinated managed cares services for the
chronically ill in managed care settings).
242 See supra text accompanying notes 103-11 (discussing the paradox of MCOs
as both financing entities and caregiving entities).
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first provision of services. 243 In the case of reinsurance, the pay-
ment for care for chronically ill enrollees would be increased when
the cost of care becomes quite high, after which each additional
treatment is paid for at a fee-for-service rate. In the case of
blended payments, the payment would be partially by capitation,
for example, fifty percent of the projected cost. Each patient en-
counter, however, would result in some fee-for-service payment,
calculated at a percentage, for example, fifty percent, of the full
fee for service rate. The result of this blending would be to share
risk smoothly between the payer and the provider, maintaining an
incentive to control cost, but moderating that incentive by ensuring
higher payments for cases requiring more intense treatment.
24
The second alteration of the financial aspects of managed care
is the "carve out" of a group, such as the chronically ill, from the
general pool, and the assignment of a greatly enhanced capitation
rate, often coupled with expanded service coverage. This method
is a distant cousin to risk adjustment, in that it attempts to maintain
capitation as the form of payment, but is binary in a way that risk
adjustment is not. That is, either an enrollee is in the general risk
pool, and is subject to the general covered services and the general
capitation rate, or he is in an entirely different plan, engineered in
both coverage and capitation to reflect the enrollee's very different
needs. 245 An example of this "carve out" methodology is the Pro-
gram for All-Inclusive Care for the Elderly (PACE), a joint Medi-
care-Medicaid managed care program. 246 The program provides an
extensive, flexibly defined array of community and social services
to the frail elderly, who are sufficiently ill otherwise to qualify for
nursing home level of care, in order to permit them to remain in
243 See Oberlander, supra note 60, at 624 (explaining the possibilities of incorpo-
rating a growing managed care system with the existing Medicare); Medicare Pay-
ment Advisory Comm'n, supra note 8, at 34-35 (describing partial capitation as an
alternative approach to risk sharing under Medicare).
244 See Medicare Payment Advisory Comm'n, supra note 8, at 34-35 (arguing
that partial capitation is a more "economically neutral" approach to sharing risk);
Newhouse et al., supra note 7, at 38-39 (discussing the benefits and important draw-
back to a payment scheme blending adjusted captitated payments and traditional
program payments).
45 See Context for a Changing Medicare Program, supra note 7, at 150 (dis-
cussing the use of "specialized managed care organizations" and "carve-outs" as
innovative ways to care for beneficiaries with disabilities and chronic illnesses).
246 See Medicare Payment Advisory Comm'n, supra note 149, at 111-20 (de-
scribing how the PACE program was "designed to keep frail elders out of nursing
homes and to reduce their use of inpatient care by providing primary, preventative,
and institutional care").
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the community and out of institutions. 247 Both Medicare and Medi-
caid pay a capitation rate, and together the amount is quite high -
ranging from $2,629 to $5,865 per month, depending on the loca-
tion of the program.248 The program is voluntary, and its goal is to
extend social and community services to permit the enrollee to
stay out of a nursing home, serving the personal goal of the enrol-
lee and the fiscal interests of the two health programs. And al-
though the program is comprised of small demonstration sites, and
results are therefore tentative, it appears to have been successful
on both scores. 249 The Balanced Budget Act of 1997 changed the
status of the PACE program from experimental to permanent,
250
and it allowed for further demonstration projects to test rate ad-
justments, such as blended, reinsured, and carved-out rates for
chronically ill Medicare enrollees.251
Both the partial capitation and carve-out adjustments to man-
aged care change the managed care bargain in a relatively dramatic
way. They reinject the payer into a much more active role in the
payment and service delivery process. Blended and capitation rates
require that the payer return to the tasks, ceded to MCOs under
pure managed care, of maintaining encounter data and paying per-
service reimbursement.252 And carve-out systems such as PACE
have yet to be fully evaluated for cost-effectiveness; certainly,
there is grave risk of selection problems, at least to the extent the
program remains binary (the enrollee is either in PACE, with its
very generous capitation rate, or is thrown back into traditional
247 See id. at 113 (detailing some of the services from which enrollees benefit,
"such as social services, nutrition counseling, extended personal care, home-delivered
meals, transportation, and respite care").
248 See id. at 116 (tabulating the capitation rates that Medicare and Medicaid pay
in the 12 PACE sites). For persons clinically eligible for PACE who are eligible for
Medicare but not Medicaid, there is a premium charged to the enrollee as a substitute
for the Medicaid payment. See id.
249 See Robert L. Kane et al., Variation in State Spending for Long-Term Care:
Factors Associated with More Balanced Systems, 23 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 363,
386-87 (1998) (discussing PACE and how management of long-term care can lower
costs and facilitate the desire of the elderly to remain in their homes as they grow
frail).
2'0 42 U.S.C. § 1395eee.
25 See 42 U.S.C. § 1395 6-1 (describing the Medicare Coordinated Care Demon-
stration Project that is designed to decrease expenditures under Title XVIII of the
Social Security Act for health care services provided to chronically ill consumers).
252 See Newhouse et al., supra note 7, at 38-39 (explaining that moving to a
"blended payment would require collecting and coding encounter data for each per-
son").
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Medicare and Medicaid). 3 That being said, neither seems to pres-
ent too much of a break from the pure "privatization" mode of
managed care finance to prevent its implementation.
The success of such halfway measures may signal an opportu-
nity to reconsider Fox's proposal to remake HCFA as a meta-
MCO?2 4 After all, with the reinjection of payers into the business
of maintaining encounter data, evaluating severity of illness, and
coordinating program design, the blended rate and carve-out ad-
justments are Fox's proposal writ small. The intermediate propos-
als exist on a continuum between "pure" managed care, where all
network creation, maintenance, and compensation tasks are pri-
vatized, and Fox's vision of HCFA acting as a huge PPO. Should
troubles with the chronically ill in nearly pure managed care arise
in great numbers, and should experiments with mixed-model sys-
tems meet with success, then the natural result will be, and should
be, a move away from privatized managed care, and toward a sys-
tem in which government (for public or public and private in-
sureds) acts as the health program, forming maintaining, and com-
pensating providers in managed care fashion.
V. CONCLUSION
Managed care can be dangerous for the chronically ill. Some
managed care plans feature highly coordinated services with a
strong primary care orientation - a very helpful innovation for the
chronically ill. Managed care's reliance on capitation and other
utilization-control techniques, however, could harm this large and
growing population segment. Managed care's treatment structure
is, at least in this respect, at war with its innovative financing
methods. The cost-saving mechanisms that have thrust managed
care into the health financing spotlight have and will inevitably
encourage plans to attempt to exclude the chronically ill, or to
withhold necessary treatment when they are enrolled.
The chronically ill, on the other hand, can be dangerous for
managed care. The social bargain that managed care promises to
meet is to constrain medical inflation while maintaining quality. It
has built a track record (and market share) through disproportion-
ately enrolling well members. The social bargain does not, how-
253 See Medicare Payment Advisory Comm'n, supra note 149, at 118-19 (noting
that HCFA has yet to analyze the economic results of the PACE program, and dis-
cussing how an appropriate base payment rate needs to be established).
24 See supra Part IV A.
1999]
138 HEALTH MATRIX [Vol. 9:79
ever, contemplate cherry picking in the long run. If public or pri-
vate regulation cannot control the tendency of MCOs toward ex-
cluding and stinting behavior toward the chronically ill, managed
care will be marginalized as a health financing mechanism in the
future. The Balanced Budget Act of 1997 forces confrontation with
this conflict. Its resolution may shape American health care for
decades to come.
